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ABSTRACT
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SCHOOLING: EVIDENCE FROM CAPE-TOWN,
SOUTH AFRICA
Moran Blueshtein
Petra E. Todd
Racial disparities in education in South Africa have been large and enduring post-
apartheid. However, moving beyond simple descriptions of these disparities to a more
detailed explanation has proven to be elusive. In this dissertation, I develop and estimate a
dynamic model of schooling and labor supply of youths in South Africa, and use it to study
several potential explanations for the racial disparities and also evaluate policies aimed to
mitigate them. The estimation is based on 1420 males age 12-22, drawn from Cape Area
Panel Study (CAPS), a rich longitudinal study of the lives of youths in the post-apartheid
era in metropolitan Cape Town, South Africa. I nd that apartheid heritage explains
40% of the African-white gap in years of schooling, and 16% of the colored-white gap in
years of schooling. My ndings highlight the role of nancial constraints in explaining
racial disparities in education. I nd that abolishing secondary school fees in all secondary
schools will eliminate 49% of the schooling gap between African and whites and 42% of
the schooling gap between coloreds and whites. On the other hand, eliminating school fees
only in former (apartheid era) African secondary schools will have a small e¤ect on African
schooling and no e¤ect on colored schooling. This nding suggests that in the South African
context, nancial constraints a¤ect human capital primarily via school quality choices and
not via school attendance decisions, casting serious doubts on the e¤ectiveness of recent
policies aimed to reduce tuitions in former African schools. The ndings further suggest
that nancial constraints are more important at the secondary school level than they are at
the college level. Abolishing college fees without altering secondary school fees will mostly
benet whites and will have a small e¤ect on African and colored schooling.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The South African education system has a legacy of gross inequality. Under the
apartheid regime, the provision of education was segregated and unequal by design
according to ones race or ethnic origin. The white minority had access to high
quality public education, with modern schools, abundant resources and highly quali-
ed teaching sta¤, whereas African schools were systematically deprived of all of the
above. The colored population, which is heavily concentrated in Cape Town and the
Western Cape Province, occupied an intermediate status between the African and the
white populations, and, although better than African schools, colored schools were
signicantly inferior to white schools.
The decade following the end of the apartheid brought about tremendous change
in South Africas education system. The segregated system was unied into a single
national race-blind system and numerous initiatives led the drive to equalize pub-
lic expenditure among the former white, colored and African schools. However, it
is widely recognized that these changes have not led to tangible improvements in
educational outcomes for the majority of African and colored populations (Van der
Berg 2002, Fiske and Ladd 2004). African and colored students perform abysmally
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on international standardized tests even when compared with students from poorer
African countries (Van der Berg, 2005, Crouch and Vinjevold, 2005). Repetition and
dropout rates amongst African and colored students are high and matriculation rates
low, with little evidence of improvement post-apartheid (Fiske and Ladd 2004).
Moving beyond simple descriptions of these disparities to a more detailed expla-
nation has, however, proven to be elusive. In this dissertation, I provide quantitative
evidence for the causes of these racial di¤erences, and on the e¤ects of several policy
schemes designed to reduce them. In particular, I investigate to what extent these
racial di¤erences are due to (i) di¤erences in access to quality education due to -
nancial constraints, (ii) di¤erences in preferences for schooling and work, (iii) labor
market discrimination, and (iv) di¤erences in observed and unobserved endowments,
which, in the South African context reect, in part, the heritage of the apartheid.
South Africa provides an interesting laboratory to examine the e¤ects of school
quality on educational outcomes and its impact on racial disparities. There is con-
siderable evidence that despite the signicant shift in scal resources in the post-
apartheid era, quality di¤erentials between former white, colored and African schools
are still rampant, and have decreased little post apartheid (Van de berg 2007, Motala
et al. 2009, Fiske and Ladd 2004, 2005). Furthermore, although education in South
Africa is a constitutional right, it is generally not free, and schools are encouraged
to charge fees both at the primary and at the secondary school levels. School fees
vary greatly between schools. Fiske and Ladd (2004) nd that although the median
secondary school student in the Western Cape faces a fee of about 250 rand a year,
close to 18 percent of the students face fees in excess of 2,000 rand a year, and more
than 15 percent face fees which are less than 100 rand a year.1 There is also a very
1The South African rand was traded at 10.3 per US dollar in August 2002, when CAPS Wave 1
began.
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high correlation between the fees charged by the school and the school quality as
reected by schools former education department, with former white schools charg-
ing the highest school fees and former African schools charging the lowest school fees
(Fiske and Ladd 2004).
In addition, research suggest that despite the promotion of race-blind policies,
most African and colored students still attend formerly African and colored schools
(Fiske and Ladd 2004). Because race and economic status, too, are highly correlated
in South Africa (Van de berg 2007), it is important to understand how school quality
a¤ects educational outcomes, and whether and how nancial constraints a¤ect school
choices of low income individuals.
To this end, I formulate and estimate a structural dynamic model of schooling and
work decisions over the life cycle. In the model, starting at age 12, young adults make
annual decisions about whether to attend school, work or stay at home (in college,
decisions to attend school and work are not mutually exclusive). I consider three types
of schools that represent three school qualities - former white schools, former colored
schools and former African schools. It is assumed that everyone attends primary
school and that the type of this school is an initial condition in the model. Individuals
who complete primary school, then make decisions regarding their secondary school
type, with same three options. As in Eckstein and Wolpin (1999), Arcidiacono (2004),
Stange (2009) and Joensen (2008), individuals who attend school face uncertainty over
their academic advancement. In this model, the probability to pass a grade in school
also depends on the quality of school attended. Individuals cannot borrow to pay
for their school fees during their secondary school phase and college, but conditional
on school attendance, they receive transfers from their families, which they take as
(weakly) exogenous. I explicitly control for both observed and unobserved sources
of heterogeneity that may a¤ect selection into di¤erent types of schools as well as
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wage o¤ers, school advancement probabilities and preference parameters. Permanent
unobservable heterogeneity is incorporated in the form of two discrete types that are
assumed to be known to the individual but unknown to the econometrician (Heckman
and Singer, 1984). Wage o¤ers represent a price paid to the human capital embodied
in a person, and following Behrman and Birdsall (1983), Card and Krueger (1992a,b)
and Bravo et al. (2010), I allow the returns to schooling to depend on the school
attended. Labor market experience accumulates endogenously as a function of past
labor supply choices. The model is estimated using maximum likelihood.
The estimation is based on 1420 young males drawn from Cape Area Panel Study
(CAPS), a longitudinal study of the lives of youths and young adults in metropolitan
Cape Town, South Africa. The data set, collected in four waves between 2002 and
2006 covers a wide range of outcomes, including schooling, employment, health, fam-
ily formation, and intergenerational support systems. Critical to this study, CAPS
contains retrospective data on work and schooling that allows the construction of
a full yearly schooling and work history for all individuals in the sample from age
12 to 22. It also contains information on the type of primary and secondary school
attended, and information on intergenerational school-related transfers.
The model builds on two main streams of literature: rst - literature on the
e¤ects of nancial constraints on educational outcomes and, second - literature on the
impact of school quality on educational outcomes (see section 2 for comprehensive
review of this literature). However this study extends the previous literature in several
important dimensions.
First, unlike previous research that has investigated the impact of nancial con-
straints on attendance and drop-out decisions of young adults, typically in their post-
secondary education level (Lochner and Monge - Naranjo 2011), this study also inves-
tigates the e¤ects of such constraints on decisions regarding the quality of the schools
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individuals choose to attend. Furthermore, it focuses on an earlier phase of education
secondary school in addition to post-secondary education.
Second, this study investigates the impact of school quality on grade advancement,
an issue that has rarely been addressed. Several studies suggest that lower student
test scores are associated with increased probability of grade repetition (Harbison and
Hanushek 1992, Gomes-Neto and Hanushek 1994). That is, students in low quality
schools may fail more grades because they have not learned as much as they progress
through school. Analyzing the relationship between test scores and grade progression
in post-apartheid South Africa, Lam et al. (2008) nd signicant e¤ects of test
scores in predicting grade progression for all race groups. However, they nd that
the relationship is weaker for African students than for white and colored students.
These ndings led the authors to suggest that these di¤erences result, in part, from
variation in schooling environments of di¤erent race groups. However, their analysis
does not examine school environments, and thus does not o¤er empirical support for
the proposed school quality e¤ects. One study that explicitly examines the correlation
between school quality and progress through school is Anderson (2000). Using South
African 1995 October Household Survey, Anderson (2000) nds a correlation between
school fees (used to proxy school quality) and the speed with which children advance
through school. Students who are behind for their grade have less money spent on
their school fees and on other school related expenses. However, the cross-sectional
nature of the data does not allow disentangling whether students who have attended
better (more expensive) schools throughout their lives fail less because of the school
quality e¤ect, or because students with higher skills come from families that invest
more in their education. Using a panel data such as CAPS, I can address the issue
of non-random selection of students into schools of di¤erent quality and to overcome
bias issues that arise in cross sectional studies.
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Furthermore, this study is one of the rst to incorporate school quality measures
into a structural dynamic model framework. To the best of my knowledge, only
one study, Bravo et al. (2010), has so far incorporated school quality measures in
a structural dynamic model approach. However, having only data on school attain-
ment and school sector (which the authors use to proxy school quality), Bravo et al.
(2010) consider only the e¤ects of school quality on earnings. CAPS, on the other
hand, contains detailed data on school advancement which allows me to extend the
framework of Bravo et al. (2010) by considering the e¤ects of school quality on grade
advancement in addition to earnings. Bravo et al. (2010) nd high returns to school
quality. However, if school quality has also positive e¤ect on advancement through
school, one would expect students attending higher quality schools to complete more
schooling and have higher school matriculation probabilities. The e¤ects of school
quality on grade advancement are thus likely to reinforce previous results, implying
that a policy intended to improve the provision of quality schooling may have greater
impact than suggested before.
In this dissertation I nd marked di¤erences amongst secondary schools of di¤erent
quality. The estimates suggest that former white schools induce the highest enroll-
ment (highest utility from attending schools), highest probability to pass a school
grade and highest returns to years of schooling, while former African schools induce
the lowest. Furthermore, the quality of a secondary school has pronounced impact
also on progress through college, with individuals attending former white secondary
schools having the highest probability to complete a grade in college, and individuals
attending former African secondary schools having the lowest.
In addition to di¤erences amongst schools, the estimates reveal important di¤er-
ences among races in their structural parameters. Africans receive the lowest wage
o¤ers for given schooling and employment histories, and whites the highest. This may
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reect discrimination in the labor market, i.e., lower skill rental prices for Africans
and, to much lesser extent, for colored. Additionally, or alternatively, it may also re-
ect that Africans (and colored) have lower skill endowments at age 12 (independent
of type). The estimates further indicate that Africans have the lowest representation
amongst the highskill endowment type, and whites the highest, which reects, in
part, the di¤erent treatments these three groups were exposed to during the apartheid
era. In addition, white, colored and African young men di¤er in their preferences to
leisure and schooling; coloreds receive the lowest utility value from leisure and whites
the highest. Africans receive the highest utility value from attending secondary school,
and whites receive the highest utility value from attending college.
I perform a number of counterfactual experiments to assess the relative impor-
tance of each factor. I nd that there is no one single factor that can account for the
entire gap in schooling outcomes amongst races. I further nd that the same factors
may have di¤erent impact on Africans and coloreds. For example, while age 12 initial
endowments have a large contribution to the African-white gap in schooling, their
contribution to the colored-white gap in schooling is substantially smaller. I further
nd that although there are substantial di¤erences in preferences for schooling and
leisure amongst races, they do not contribute to the large racial gap in schooling.
Surprisingly, labor market discrimination, too, mitigates racial disparities in educa-
tion, especially for Africans, because with less attractive labor market opportunities
individuals stay longer in school.
The structural framework also permits an evaluation of the importance of nancial
constraints and the potential success of alternative monetary interventions to inuence
schooling of African and colored young men, and to mitigate racial disparities in
education amongst the three races. Abolishing secondary school fees in all three school
systems has a very large e¤ect on African and Colored youth, though only small e¤ect
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on whites. The simulation suggests that with this intervention, all individuals would
choose to attend former white secondary schools. Due to increased enrolment levels
and faster progression through schools, by the age of 23, African men complete, on
an average, 11.86 years of schooling, colored men complete 11.67 years of schooling,
and white men complete 13.38 years of schooling (an increase of 1.4, 1.2 and 0.08
years, respectively). Abolishing school fees only in former African and former colored
secondary schools has a substantial e¤ect on Africans; with this change 98% of them
attend former colored schools, and they complete on average 11.10 years of schooling.
It would have a moderate e¤ect on colored; an increase of 0.25 years of schooling, but
no e¤ect on whites. Abolishing schools fees only in former African secondary schools
will have a small e¤ect on Africans (an increase of 0.09 years of schooling), and no
e¤ect on colored and whites. Lastly, abolishing school fees at the post-secondary
school level without altering secondary school fees will mostly benet whites (average
increase of 0.13 years of schooling), and will have a smaller e¤ect on Africans and
coloreds, suggesting that intervention at post-secondary school level will only reinforce
the already overwhelming racial gap in education, while intervention at the secondary
school level can dramatically decrease racial gaps in education.
These results have important implications for the debate over school fees in South
Africa and in other developing countries. South Africas decision to permit schools
to impose compulsory fees on their students was made at a time when other African
countries such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique and Uganda started
moving in the opposite direction by abolishing primary school fees. The principal
argument in the literature for abolishing fees is that they are a major cause of non-
enrollment among the poor, and, indeed, many African countries experienced a sharp
surge in enrollment following their abolishing of primary school fees (World Bank,
2009). Sensitive to this critique, the South African government passed the Education
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Laws Amendment Act No. 24 in 2005 to allow the Minister of Education to declare
some schools no-fee schools, especially those serving poverty-stricken communities.
No-fee school policy implementation started at the beginning of 2007 and the policy
is implemented mainly in formerly African schools in the poorest provinces of South
Africa. However, the results from the model simulations indicate that a policy that
abolishes school fees only in former African schools does little to increase enrollment
and to mitigate racial disparities in education. This research, thus, casts serious
doubts on the common policy debate about perceived trade-o¤s between wide access
to schooling opportunities and the development of high-quality schools. Addressing
the issues of school quality di¤erentials across di¤erent types of schools and of segre-
gation induced by large disparities in prices are crucial for achieving racial equality
in education.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Section two discusses the exist-
ing literature and reviews the South-African education system during the apartheid
and its heritage post-apartheid. Section three describes the model and the estima-
tion approach. Section four presents the data, and section ve presents the empirical
results. Section six presents the counterfactual experiments and section seven con-
cludes.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Summary of Literature on School Quality
2.1.1 School Quality and Educational Outcomes
Quantity of schooling is easily measured, and data on school attainment are readily
available. Quality, on the other hand, is harder to measure. Thus, one of the chal-
lenges in estimating the impact of school quality on human capital accumulation has
simply been how to measure quality. Most past analyses of human capital ignore any
quality di¤erences across schools, essentially assuming that a year of schooling is a
year of schooling irrespective of the schools quality. Some researchers have however
attempted to capture school quality using di¤erent approaches.
One approach adopted in prior research is to use test scores as proxies for school
quality. Mounting evidence testify to the importance of test scores in understanding
schooling outcomes. For instance, Rivkin (1995) nds that variations in test scores
capture a considerable proportion of the systematic variation in high school comple-
tion and in college continuation, and that test score di¤erences can fully explain black-
white di¤erences in schooling in the U.S. Bishop (1991) and Hanushek et al. (1996)
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nd that test scores are highly correlated with school attendance, and Hanushek and
Pace (1995) nd that college completion is signicantly related to higher test scores at
the end of high school. However, this approach is likely to yield biased estimates for
the e¤ect of school quality because test scores are a¤ected not only by school quality
but also by other factors such as family background and individual ability di¤erences.
A second approach to account for di¤erences in school quality has been to use
school input measures, such as expenditure per student, average class size or teacher
credentials, in an educational production function approach. This approach has
yielded mixed results and has been subjected to considerable criticism (Harbison
and Hanushek 1992, Hanushek 1995, 1996, 2003). Hanushek (1996) notes that three
decades of intensive research leave a clear picture that school resource variations are
not closely related to variations in student outcomes. He suggests that schools are
characterized by widespread ine¢ ciency and therefore, commonly used inputs mea-
sures are of little use, at least in the developed world context.
The situation is somewhat di¤erent for developing countries. Reviewing this lit-
erature, Hanushek (1995), Hanushek and Harbison (1992), Lockheed and Hanushek
(1988) and Todd (2010) conclude that in the developing world context some inputs
have been found to be consistently and signicantly related to improvements in ed-
ucational outcomes. This has also been true in the specic case of South Africa.
Case and Deaton (1999) examine the relationship between student-teacher ratios and
school outcomes immediately before the end of the apartheid government. Controlling
for household background, they nd strong and signicant e¤ects of student-teacher
ratios on enrollment, on years of completed schooling, and on test scores for numeracy.
Using 1996 South African census and two national surveys of school quality, Case and
Yogo (1999) nd that quality of schools, as proxied by student-teacher ratios, has a
large and signicant e¤ect on educational attainment. Reducing the student-teacher
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ratio by 10 students would, all else equal, increase completed schooling by 0.6 years.
Researchers have also exploited a related measure the former education depart-
ment of a school under the apartheid regime as measure of its quality (Van der
Berg 2007, Yamauchi 2011). As I describe in more detail in section 2.3, the segre-
gated school system under the apartheid regime was intentionally designed to have
striking di¤erences in qualities between the schools meant for each of the races. These
di¤erences in school qualities have persisted post-apartheid, making former school de-
partments a natural measure for school quality. Indeed, Van der Berg (2007) nds
that racial composition of schools, as a proxy for former school department, is a ma-
jor explanatory factor in explaining matriculation rates of South African students in
early 2000s. Similarly, using school level data from early 2000s, Yamauchi (2011)
nds that racial composition of schools and the former apartheid department of edu-
cation signicantly a¤ect school fees, which are linked to quality of education. I too
use former school departments as a proxy for school quality.
Recently, researchers have attempted to infer school quality using longitudinal
data of student educational outcomes. Rivkin et al. (2005) estimate the e¤ect of
teacher quality on performances of primary school students in the State of Texas.
The authors exploit repeated performance observations for individual students and
multiple cohorts using a xed e¤ect approach as a means of controlling explicitly
for student heterogeneity and the nonrandom matching of students, teachers, and
schools. They nd that teacher quality (and therefore, school quality) matters greatly
to student performances. A goodteacher (one standard deviation of quality above
the mean) as compared to the mean teacher quality would lead the average student to
move up over four percentile points in a year, which means that if a student had a good
teacher as opposed to an average teacher for ve years in a row, the increased learning
would be su¢ cient to close entirely the gap between a typical low-income student and
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a higher-income student (i.e. one not on free or reduced lunch). Interestingly, they
nd that the e¤ects of observable teacher and school characteristics are generally
small and concentrated among younger students.
Educational outcome-based measures of school quality are also employed by Hanushek
et al. (2008) to investigate how school quality a¤ects drop-out decisions of primary
school students in Egypt. Hanushek et al. (2008) estimate variations in school quality,
based on student outcomes in di¤erent schools and then use the estimates of school
quality as a potential determinant of dropout behavior. They nd that with the
individuals own ability and achievement held constant, a student attending a higher-
quality school will tend to stay in school, whereas a student attending a lower-quality
school is more likely to drop out and complete fewer grades. Furthermore, they nd
that bringing all schools up to the best-quality school would reduce the dropout rate
estimated in their sample by two-thirds or more.
2.1.2 School Quality and Earnings
Much of the prior research has not considered the direct impact of school quality on
earnings. Most attention has been, and still is, directed at the returns to years of
schooling or school attainment. However, school quality is likely to have direct impli-
cations for cognitive skills, and thus, for earnings. There is consistent evidence that
cognitive skills, as measured by test performance, are closely related to individual pro-
ductivity and earnings in the U.S. (e.g., Mulligan 1999, Murnane et al. 2000, Lazear
2003). Similar results have been shown in studies for other developed and developing
countries, though the evidence from these countries is fairly limited1. Studies that
have explicitly examined the correlation between school quality and earnings suggest
1For studies in developing countries see: Boissiere, Knight, and Sabot (1985), Knight and Sabot
(1990), Glewwe (1996), Angrist and Lavy (1997), Jolli¤e (1998), Moll (1998), Vijverberg (1999), and
Behrman, Ross, and Sabot (2008).
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that there are high returns to school quality. Using earning data from U.S 1980
census, Card and Krueger (1992a) nd that men who were educated in states with
higher-quality schools have a higher return to additional years of schooling. Rates of
return are also higher for individuals from states with better-educated teachers. In
addition, Card and Krueger (1992b) nd that improvements in the relative quality
of black schools in the U.S explain 20 percent of the narrowing of the black-white
earnings gap between 1960 and 1980.
Behrman and Birdsal (1983) were the rst to extend the standard Mincerian ap-
proach to incorporate school quality measures in addition to quantity of schooling, and
show that exclusion of school quality may upwardly bias the estimated returns to years
of schooling. Hanushek et al. (2008) further suggest that inclusion of school quality
may resolve the paradox of high premature school drop-out in developing countries.
Though it is widely accepted that schooling in developing countries has a high payo¤,
especially for lower levels of schooling (e.g., Psacharopoulos 1994, Psacharopoulos and
Patrinos 2004), if rate of return is based solely on quantity of schooling ignoring the
big di¤erences in school quality in developing countries, and if quality and quantity
of schooling completed are positively correlated, then the estimates suggested by the
literature are the returns for individuals who attend relatively high quality schools
and complete more schooling, and they do not reect the returns that an individ-
ual who only has the option of attending a lower quality school would receive had
he completed schooling in a low quality school. Under this argument, individuals
behave rationally in dropping out of low quality schools at an early age. However,
Hanushek et al. (2008) use a standard static Mincerian earning model (augmented
by achievements as a proxy for school quality), and thus, they do not o¤er empirical
support for their proposed forwardlooking strategic behavior.
To my knowledge, only one study, Bravo et al. (2009), has so far incorporated
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school quality measures in a structural dynamic model approach. Bravo et al. (2009)
estimate a dynamic behavioral model of schooling and labor force participation de-
cisions to study the e¤ects of school vouchers on educational outcomes and earnings
in Chile. They allow the returns to schooling to depend on the type of primary
and secondary school attended (municipal school, private subsidized school and pri-
vate non-subsidized school), and on whether attendance took place in the pre-or-post
school voucher regime (Chile started its voucher program in 1980), thus allowing
changes in the quality of schooling due to the change in the regime. Their ndings
suggest that returns to schooling are lowest in municipal schools and are highest in the
private nonsubsidized schools, and that the reform improved the quality of primary
schools, but not that of secondary schools. They further show that the voucher re-
form altered school choices of individuals who move away from low quality municipal
schools, and that with vouchers, individuals achieve higher educational attainment
levels and higher high-school and college graduation rates. These ndings support
the importance of school quality in determining educational outcomes of students,
though, interestingly, the authors nd that the voucher reform did not lead to in-
creased overall mean wages in spite of increased school attainment partially because
the reform decreased the returns to secondary schooling.
2.2 Summary of Literature on Financial Constraints
2.2.1 Financial Constraints and School Outcomes
One of the key issues in economic research on education is the extent to which nan-
cial constraints a¤ect school outcomes of children from low-income families. Although
there is clear evidence that family income is strongly correlated with school outcomes,
there are di¤erent interpretations of what that correlation means. One interpretation
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is that low-income families cannot a¤ord to pay tuition and other costs of educa-
tion, a problem that could potentially be solved through fee reductions or nancial
aid. Another interpretation is that there are long-term educational disadvantages
from growing up in a low-income family and reduced tuition or nancial aid will
not be su¢ cient to compensate for the cumulative educational disadvantage faced by
students from low-income families.
Summary of studies in the U.S.
Considerable research has analyzed the e¤ects of nancial constraints on educational
outcomes in the United States, primarily focusing on attendance and drop-out deci-
sions of individuals in postsecondary education. Studies based on the 1979 cohort of
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) generally suggest that nancial
constraints play a marginal role in explaining lower college attendance of individu-
als from low income families in the 1980s. Cameron and Heckman (1998, 1999), for
instance, nd a strong positive association between current family income and the
probability of college attendance conditional on high school graduation, even after
controlling for the e¤ects of dynamic selection on unobservables. However, that as-
sociation between family income and college attendance is becoming very small and
statistically insignicant after controlling for adolescence Armed Forces Qualication
Tests (AFQT), suggesting that skills and early life resource disadvantage and not
short term liquidity constraints are driving the educational gap in college attendance
between rich and poor in the U.S. Carneiro and Heckman (2002) also estimate small
di¤erences in college enrollment rates and other college-going outcomes by family
income after accounting for di¤erences in family background and AFQT scores.
These results are further corroborated by Cameron and Taber (2004) and Keane
and Wolpin (2001). Cameron and Taber (2004) use the NLSY 1979 cohort to estimate
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a lifecycle model with a discrete set of schooling options to test di¤erent discount rates
in schooling choices. Evidence that some individuals face high interest rates relative
to others would imply that borrowing constraints distort their education decisions.
However, they nd no evidence of discount rate heterogeneity in their sample. Keane
and Wolpin (2001), on the other hand, suggest that nancial constraints are tight
(less than one-third the estimated cost of a single semester of post-secondary school)
and are often binding for the NLSY 1979 cohort, but they too conclude that they
do not distort schooling decisions. This surprising result is obtained because low-
income students respond to their nancial constraints by increasing their labor and
reducing consumption. Simulating a policy that increases college loan limits, Keane
and Wolpin (2001) nd that such a policy will reduce work and increase consumption
among previously constrained students, but will have a negligible e¤ect on college
attendance.
However, some research suggests that nancial constraints have become more im-
portant in late 1990s and early 2000s.2 Belley and Lochner (2007) use the NLSY
1997 cohort and nd that family income has become much more strongly correlated
with college attendance for recent cohorts. Youth from high income families in the
NLSY97 are 16 percentage points more likely to attend college than are youth from
low income families, conditional on AFQT scores, family composition, parental age
and education, race/ethnicity, and urban/rural residence. Further evidence of -
nancial constraints in the U.S. is provided by Lovenheim (2011). Lovenheim (2011)
uses data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics to estimate the impacts of
exogenous changes in housing wealth (driven by local housing booms and busts) on
post-secondary enrollment decisions. He estimates that increases in house values
2Ellwood and Kane (2000) argue that college attendance di¤erences by family income were already
becoming more important by the early 1990s.
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caused increased college attendance among families that would otherwise have been
constrained. He also nds that the impacts of housing wealth have become more
important in the 2000s.
Determining the e¤ects of nancial constraints on education is challenging because
standard data do not provide a direct way of identifying which students are credit
constrained. Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008) overcome this problem by devel-
oping a survey to directly address these issues. Students at Berea College, a unique
college in Kentucky that o¤ers a full tuition subsidy and large room and board subsi-
dies to all of its student, were asked if they would borrow more money (and how much)
if a fair interestloan was possible. Students are dened to be credit constrained
if they self-reported a desire to borrow more for college. The authors nd that -
nancial constraints have a non-trivial e¤ect on students who are constrained. Their
estimates indicate that between 40% and 48% of the drop-out rate of constrained
students should be attributed to the constraint. However, they nd that the rela-
tive number of credit constrained students is small. Their results thus suggest that
the large majority of college attrition (which is signicant at Berea) would remain
even if students are given free access to loans (in addition to the current generous
fee and board subsidies), and that factors other than borrowing constraints explain
more than 85% of the dropout rate at Berea College. These results corroborate an
earlier study that suggested that reasons unrelated to the direct cost of schooling are
important in determining high attrition rates of students from low income families at
Berea College (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2003).3 It should be noted, however,
3Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2003) analyze longitudinal data from Berea College, a unique
liberal U.S college that provides a full tuition subsidy and large room and board subsidies to all
entering students regardless of family background. They nd that although the direct costs of
schooling are approximately zero for all students in this college, a strong positive relationship remains
between family income and the length of time that an individual remains at school, suggesting that
reasons unrelated to the direct cost of schooling are important in determining high attrition rates
of students from low income families.
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that the study was conducted in one college which makes it di¢ cult to extend the
ndings to other colleges in the U.S., and that the study is limited to examining the
e¤ects of nancial constraints on drop-out decisions of students already enrolled in
college, but not on college attendance decisions.
Brown, Scholz and Seshadri (2011) propose another way of identifying which youth
may be credit constrained. They consider a model of intergenerational transfers with
one-sided altruism: parents are assumed to care about their children and they are
able to borrow freely. However, they cannot write enforceable loan contracts with
their children, and, thus, may not want to transfer enough resources to satisfy the
childs full demand for consumption and schooling at college ages. Their model as-
sumes that youth would be borrowing constrained if they did not receive help from
their parents, suggesting that one can distinguish between constrainedyouth and
unconstrained youth based on the presence of post-secondary parental transfers.
Using intergenerational data on educational attainment and family transfers for the
U.S. during the 1970-1990, the authors nd that a signicant number - roughly 50%
- of all youth in their sample are borrowing constrained. Moreover, they nd that
nancial aid will have sharply di¤erent e¤ects on parent-child pairs in the two regions
of the models equilibrium: for parents who make post-college transfers, additional
nancial aid should have negligible e¤ect on educational attainment, because parents
already make the e¢ cient level of investment in their childs education. But chil-
dren of parents who do not make post college transfers under-invest in education.
For these children, an increase in nancial aid will increase educational attainment;
their estimates suggest that among constrainedyouth, an additional $3,600 in aid
increases average schooling levels by 0.2 years.
Surprisingly, despite extensive evidence that adolescent skill levels are important
for subsequent schooling and lifetime earnings (see, e.g., Cameron and Heckman 1998,
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Keane and Wolpin 1997, 2001, and Carneiro and Heckman 2002), very little research
in the U.S. investigates the impact of nancial constraints on educational outcomes
other than for post-secondary education. Several recent studies show that exogenous
increases in family income lead to improvements in early child development (e.g.
Mogstad and Wiswall 2009, Duncan, Morris and Rodrigues 2011, Milligan and Stabile
2011). Financial constraints may play a crucial role explaining these ndings. While
generous government student loan programs are available for college education in the
U.S., nancial aid programs are typically not available for elementary or secondary
education. Furthermore, even though elementary and secondary education is publicly
provided, nancial constrains may a¤ect human capital not only via school attendance
decisions, but via school quality choices, since the quality of public schools available
to poor American families is often low, and high quality private schools and preschool
programs are typically quite expensive.
This study has, therefore, implications beyond its specic context of South Africa.
It contributes to the developing literature on nancial constraints of school age chil-
dren by explicitly investigating the impact of nancial constraints on selection of
children into secondary schools and into types of schools. I show that nancial con-
straints are crucial at the secondary school level, not because they limit access to
secondary education, but mainly because they force children from poor families to
attend low quality schools. Moreover, I provide evidence that nancial constraints at
the secondary school level are more important than in the post-secondary education
phase. Removal of school fees at the secondary school level will eliminate a substantial
part of the racial gap in educational outcomes in post-apartheid South-Africa, but
the e¤ect of removal of fees at the post-secondary school level on schooling outcomes
is very small.
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Summary of Studies in Developing Countries
Developing countries often have large income inequalities and limited credit accessi-
bility. Therefore, nancial constraints may have strong implications on human capital
accumulation in these countries. Nevertheless, most research on nancial constraints
in the developing world context has examined the link between nancial constraints
and child-labor, and direct evidence on the relevance of such constraints on schooling
investment is limited.
Dehejia and Gatti (2002) use cross-country data on child labor to investigate the
association between child labor and access to credit (as proxied by nancial devel-
opment) across countries. They nd a signicant negative and robust relationship
between the two variables, which is particularly sizeable in poor countries. Guarcello
et al. (2002) analyze the response of child labor to broadly dened income shocks (loss
of employment, death in the family, droughts in the region, etc.) in Guatemala. They
identify a sub-sample of credit-constrained households using information on denial of
credit for households that applied and self-reported information on why a family was
not able to apply for credit among non-applicants. They nd that credit rationing
is associated with higher child labor and that negative income shocks signicantly
increase the proportion of working children. Beegle et al. (2003) use panel data
from Tanzania to identify the di¤erential response of child labor to income shocks
of households with credit access relative to those without. Their measure of credit
access is collateralizable asset holdings, which they interact with income shocks in a
household xed-e¤ects regression. The authors nd that households protect them-
selves from adverse income shocks by varying their childrens work hours, an e¤ect
which is mitigated when households have more collateralizable assets to secure access
to credit. Among the most convincing empirical evidences of the impact of nancial
constraints on child labor is Edmonds (2006), who examines the change in child labor
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in response to anticipated income changes. Theoretically, households that are not
credit constrained should be able to borrow against known future increases in income
and smooth child labor hours over time. Using the discontinuity introduced by the
age-eligibility rule of a pension program in South Africa (which is large and highly
anticipated), he nds that households with pension-eligible members decrease child
work only after household members become eligible to receive the funds. His results
suggest that households cannot borrow against even near guaranteed ows of future
income to smooth child labor hours.
These results all point to child labor as one of the mechanisms that households
use to smooth transitory income shocks and suggest that expanding access to credit
might be e¤ective in mitigating the prevalence of child labor. However, it is not
obvious that there is a one-to-one trade-o¤ between time spent in school and time
spent working. Children who are not working are not necessarily enrolled in school
and, in many cases, children combine schooling with work. Furthermore, hours in
either activity may be su¢ ciently low on average that an increase in time spent in
one activity will not crowd out time spent in another, as opposed to crowding out
leisure time (Ravallion and Wodon 2000).
Several studies have directly investigated the impact of nancial constraints on
educational outcomes. Mimoun (2008) uses cross-country data on school enrolment,
income inequality and credit accessibility from 19 OECD countries and 67 developing
countries from 1970 2000. He nds that both income inequality and the development
of credit markets are highly signicant in explaining the international variance in
school enrolment ratios in both secondary and post-secondary education.
Jacoby (1994) modies a model developed by BenPorath (1967) to test the ef-
fects of credits constraints on grade completion in Peru. Grade repetition in Peru is
tied directly to school attendance, because the country has instituted a grade pro-
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motion policy where students were required to complete a given series of lessons to
advance into the next grade rather than pass a set of exams. To obtain a test for
borrowing constraints the sample was split to constrained and not constrained
based on reported loan activities. The author nds that higher family income and
durable goods holdings do not signicantly enhance grade completion in households
that are unconstrained, but they do in constrained households, supporting the hy-
pothesis that unequal access to credit is indeed an important source of inequality in
schooling investment.
Attanasio and Kaufman (2009) use data on subjective expectations to provide
evidence on the importance of credit constraints in secondary and post-secondary
schooling decisions in Mexico. They suggest that schooling should increase with
expected returns. However, if the demand for schooling is constrained by some binding
level of debt, then this relationship will no longer holds. Therefore, if one were
to observe that the only youths for whom there is a positive relationship between
expected returns and enrolment decisions, are those living with wealthier parents,
then one would conclude that nancial constraints might be playing an important role
in determining who attends school. Their results points out towards the importance of
nancial constraints in college attendance decisions, but not in high school attendance
decisions, which is consistent with higher costs for college and low availability of
fellowships and loans at the higher education level in Mexico.
Solis (2011) exploits a natural experiment that produces random variation in credit
access, to analyze the e¤ects of nancial constraints on enrollment and progress in
college in Chile. Financing programs in Chile o¤er college tuition loans to students
who: rst, apply for benets; second, belong to the lowest four income quintiles;
and third, score above a certain cuto¤ in the national College Admission Test. Be-
ing barely above or below the cuto¤ is random in a small vicinity of the threshold.
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Therefore, comparing college enrollment rates for the group just above (the treatment
group) and the group just below (the control group) gives the causal e¤ect of credit
access on college enrollment. Using a regression discontinuity identication strat-
egy, Solis (2011) nds that easing credit constraints by giving access to loans have
tremendous impact on both enrollment in college and progress in college4. A Regres-
sion discontinuity identication approach is also used by Gurgand et al. (2011) to
analyze the e¤ects of loan access on college enrollment in South Africa in mid 2000s.
They too nd that nancial constraints are substantial, as they decrease enrollment
by more than 20 percentage points in a population of student loan applicants. Lam
et al. (2010) on the other hand, use an indirect approach, similar to that of Carneiro
and Heckman (2002) and show that controlling for scores on literacy and numeracy
evaluation test reduces the apparent e¤ect of baseline income on college enrollment,
suggesting that reasons other than credits constraints explain the low enrollment level
of individuals from poor families. The ndings in this dissertation support those of
Lam et al. (2010) for college attendance, though I suggest that nancial constraints
at the secondary school level are responsible for a substantial part of the racial gap
in education in the sample.
4Students with loan access increase their enrollment probability by 21 percentage points, which
is equivalent to a 133% increase in the enrollment rate of the group without access to loans. In
addition, eligible students increase their probability of enrolling in a second year by 33 percentage
points, and in a third year by 29 percentage points. Those numbers are equivalent to a 232% and
331% increase, respectively, when compared with the enrollment probability for the groups without
access to loans.
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2.3 South African School System and the Legacy
of the Apartheid
During the apartheid, the provision of education was racially segregated. In Urban
areas, four separate departments operated schools for each of the four main racial
groups: white students were served by the House of Assembly (HOA), colored students
by the House of Representatives (HOR), Indian students by the House of Delegates
(HOD), and African students by the Department of Education and training (DET)5.
In addition, there were ten departments operating schools for Africans in each of
the ten homelands of South Africa. For most of the Apartheid era students were
restricted to attending schools (including post-secondary schools) operated by their
relevant department of education.
Not only were the education systems racially segregated, they were also very un-
equal. Although resources were lavished on schools serving white students, non-white
(and in particular African) schools were systematically deprived of qualied teachers,
physical resources and teaching aids. In addition, funds raising by parent bodies,
including commercial sponsorships and school fees, enabled many white schools to
add to their facilities, equipment and learning resources, and expand their range of
cultural and sporting activities. At the peak of the apartheid, schools serving white
students had more than 10 times the funding per student than schools serving African
students (Fiske and Ladd 2005).
The government that won the rst fully democratic election in 1994 quickly moved
towards race-blind policies in both the structure and funding of public education.
5Due to the low percentage of individulas of Indian origin in the population, Indians are coded as
coloredin CAPS. Consequentially, I consider three race groups - whites, colored and Africans and
three types of school departments -former white, former colored and former African schools (that is,
a colored school can be either HOR or HOD school).
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South Africas new constitution identied basic education as a right for all citizens
and education was made compulsory up to age 15. It was the rst time that any
education had been compulsory for Africans.6 Furthermore, the racially dened de-
partments of education were replaced with a single national race-blind system that
included nine newly established provinces that shared responsibility for primary and
secondary education with the national government. Responsibility for post-secondary
education was assigned exclusively to the national government. The national govern-
ment also retained the responsibility to set national norms and standards related to
the distribution of teacher slots and non-personnel spending across schools within
provinces and to negotiate teacher salaries.
Under the new system, the federal government provides race-blind and equitable
shares of funding to all provinces based on a weighted formula computed from actual
school enrollments and school-age children to ensure that each province, regardless
of its wealth, will be able to spend the same amount on education per student as any
other province (Fiske and Ladd 2004, p. 103).7 Furthermore, the national norms
regarding teacher slots and salaries and non-personnel spending have contributed
greatly to reduced di¤erences in public spending across schools serving students of
di¤erent race within provinces. In 2001, for instance, spending on behalf of students
in the former white schools in the Western Cape was about 28 percent higher than
that for students in former African schools and about 6-7 percent higher than that
for students in formerly colored schools (Fiske and Ladd 2005), compared with two
and a half fold di¤erential observed at the end of the apartheid period between white
6Nontheless, in the model, individuals younger than 15 are allowed not to attend school, since
this is observed in the data.
7Data on public spending per learner show that although great progress was made between 1995
and 2001 in equalizing public spending across the countrys nine new provinces, disparities still
remain. In 2001, average per learner spending in the Western Cape province exceeded the national
average by 30 percent, and by contrast, spending in Eastern Cape and Limpopo, South Africas two
most impoverished provinces, fell short the national average by 25 percent or more.
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and African schools.
Nonetheless, the apartheid heritage is enduring and there are still striking di¤er-
ences between the qualities of the facilities of schools in the former white, colored and
African schools. Yamauchi (2005) nds that even though most provinces took steps
between 1996 and 2002 to increase the number of classrooms in the former African
and colored schools, major shortfalls remain which translate to high student-teacher
ratio in these schools. Colored and especially African schools also fall short in basic
amenities such as water, telephone, electricity, libraries, media centers and comput-
ers (Fiske and Ladd 2005). Even more important are the striking di¤erences in the
qualication of teachers. By the end of the Apartheid, more than one in three teach-
ers in schools serving non-whites was under-qualied. Although the proportions of
under-qualied teachers dropped to one in ve in 2001, this gure understates the
disparities among schools, because many African and colored teachers received their
training in low quality teacher colleges that have since been shut down because of
their poor quality (Fiske and Ladd 2004).
Further complicating its quest for equality, in 1996, South Africa enacted the
South African Schools Act 1996, mandating that all schools elect school governing
bodies that, by design, are dominated by parents. School governing bodies were given
signicant authority, from the setting of admissions policy and making admission
decisions (subject to nondiscrimination requirements) to making recommendations
to the provincial department of education regarding the appointment of teachers and
sta¤. This act was a result of a political compromise; as apartheid began to wane
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the white government transferred ownership of
the physical property of all white schools to the parents in these schools and granted
them signicant authority to run their schools as a means to preserve white privilege.
Seeking the support of the minority white population, the new government decided
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not to roll back control from these schools and, instead, granted local control to all
schools in the country. The case was also made that local school control would benet
the non-white communities as well, because it would ameliorate the rooted distrust
of non-whites towards the South African school system, traditionally viewed by them
as an instrument of the apartheid.
The biggest controversy has risen around the provision that allowed school gov-
erning bodies to augment public funds by charging fees to parents:8
A governing body of a public school must take all reasonable measures
within its means to supplement the resources supplied by the State in order
to improve the quality of education provided by the schools to all learners
at the school.
In other words, at the same time that public funds were being distributed more
equally across schools, schools serving a­ uent communities were able to use revenues
generated from parents to augment their public resources. Since 1996, when such
schools were required to down-size their sta¤ establishments, many have been able
to recruit additional sta¤ on governing body contracts, paid from the school fund.
For instance, Fiske and Ladd (2004) nd that in 2000, fee revenue permitted the
former white schools in the Western Cape to augment their state-paid teaching sta¤
by about 30 percent on average, and in some cases by more than 100 percent. By
contrast, former African schools were able to augment their state-paid teaching sta¤s
on average by less than 1 percent.
The fee policy was justied at the time on the ground that by helping to maintain
school quality, school fees would keep the children of middle class families regardless
of their race  from leaving the public schools, thus providing continuing political
8South African Schools Act, 1996, p. 21.
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support for the public education system and avoiding the creation of yet another
segregated educational system in South Africa. Indeed, the policy achieved this goal.
Private schools serve less than 3% of the student population in South Africa, and
even in the richer province of Western Cape the gure is 3.1% (Fiske and Ladd 2004).
However, the policy failed to decrease segregation in the public school system,
despite an additional policy adopted in 1998 that exempted qualied low-income
families from fees. Although schools cannot lawfully discriminate against students
based on their race, test scores or ability to pay fees, the fee policy gave incentives to
schools to minimize the admission of low-income students to avoid substantial cross
subsidies of such students by the more a­ uent parents (Selod and Zenou 2003). In
2001, only 2.5% of primary school students and 3.7% of secondary school students in
South Africa received a partial or a full fee exemption, gures that rise to 4.1% and
5.7%, respectively, in historically white schools (Fiske and Ladd 2004). Consequently,
African students continue to account for nearly 100 percent of the enrollment in the
former African schools in the Western Cape, Colored - for 93% of the students in
the former colored schools in the Western Cape, and white students - for 66% of the
students in the former white schools in the Western Cape (Fisk and Ladd 2004).
Another evidence of lingering legacy of educational inequities from the apartheid
era is the racial disparities in school outcomes. A series of cross-national standardized
tests have shown that South African students are not internationally competitive (Van
der Berg 2005, Crouch and Vinjevold 2005), and they are shown to have performed
poorly even within Africa. However, in the midst of South Africas poor performance
on these international tests, there are pockets of international excellence that are
strongly correlated with race. Similar disparities emerge from work analyzing matric-
ulation exam results, in particular scores in mathematics and science (Van der Berg
2005, Bhorat and Oosthuisen 2006). Moreover, the post-apartheid school system is
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characterized by high rates of grade repetition and lengthy school careers for African
and colored youth (Lam, Ardington and Leibbrandt 2011), while African also experi-
ence low transitions from school to employment with only 37% of African males aged
21-22 reporting ever obtaining employment (Lam, Leibbrandt and Mlatsheni 2009).
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Chapter 3
Model
I formulate a nite horizon dynamic discrete choice model of school decisions and labor
market participation, where individuals choose every year from a nite set of mutually
exclusive alternatives in order to maximize their discounted expected lifetime utility.
Every year, beginning at the age (a) of twelve, each individual makes a decision
whether to attend school or not. If he attends school, he passes the school grade
and accumulates the associated human capital with a probability that depends on
his current state variables. It is assumed that individuals do not drop out of school
if they do not attend school in a given year. The model allows for re-enrollment in
school after spans of no enrollment as this behavior is observed in the data.
I consider three levels of education: primary education (pr), secondary educa-
tion (sec) and post-secondary education (col). Individuals complete their primary
education after passing eight years of schooling, secondary education after passing
twelve years of schooling, and post-secondary education after passing sixteen years
of schooling. Once individuals graduate from college, they can either work or stay at
home.
I consider three types of primary schools: former African schools (det), former
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colored schools (hor), and former white schools (hoa), i.e., pr 2 fdet; hor; hoag. The
type of primary school is an initial condition in the model as all individuals in the
sample attended primary schools prior to age 12. Individuals are not allowed to
change their school type during primary school (as this is very rare in the data).
Once individuals complete their primary education, they can choose a secondary
school, with the same three options as before, i.e., sec 2 fdet; hor; hoag. School type
decision is made only once, upon attending the rst year of secondary education and
it cannot be changed in the following years. Individuals incur a cost of transitioning
from primary to secondary school that depends on the type of secondary school in
relation to the type of primary school they attended. This cost can be thought of
as capturing costs of transferring from one school system to another, facing a new
environment, and traveling longer distances to get to a secondary school (since det;
hor and hoa schools are geographically segregated). Let spr;ja = 1 if individuals
attend type j of primary school at age a, and ssec;ja = 1 if individuals attend type j
of secondary school at age a; j 2 fdet; hor; hoag. Similarly, let scola = 1 if individuals
attend college at age a (else the indicator variable is 0).
In addition to school choices, each individual makes a yearly decision whether to
work or not at a given wage (w) o¤ered to him. I assume that individuals can only
work full time (i.e., 160 hours per month) and that the (ln) hourly wage o¤er is given
by:
lnwa = 0 + 1  Iftype = highg+ 2  colored+ 3  white+
4  Spra + 5  Sseca +
6  Sseca  Ifsec = horg+ 7  Sseca  Ifsec = hoag+
8  Scola + 9 Ha + 10  ha 1 + 11  aa + "wa (3.1)
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I allow the wage to depend on unobserved type (type) to capture unobservable
heterogeneity in human capital. Wage also depends on race (colored and white are
race indicators that equal one if the individual is colored or white, respectively) to
capture labor market discrimination or other di¤erences in age 12 endowments that
are correlated with race but are independent of type. This wage equation extends
the standard Mincer equation as I allow the return from schooling to di¤er among
human capital accumulated in primary (Spr), secondary (Ssec) and post-secondary
(Scol) school levels, as well as to di¤er among the three former school departments at
the secondary school level. Furthermore, I allow for an additional sources of human
capital for individuals who worked in the previous year (ha 1 = 1): At the beginning
of each year, individuals observe the realization of the their wage shock, "wa , and make
a decision (h) whether to work at this given wage or not. Let ha = 1 if individuals
work at age a (else the indicator variable is 0). Work experience is accumulated
endogenously according to the following rule:
Ha+1 = Ha + ha: (3.2)
Individuals cannot simultaneously attend school and work during their primary
and secondary education levels, but they can simultaneously work and attend college.
Individuals who do not work and do not attend school at a given age are assumed
to be at home and receive one unit of leisure. Individuals receive no leisure if they
attend school or work.
Individuals accumulate human capital if they pass the grade they attended. The
probability that they pass the school grade is given by:
prob(passa = 1) =
exp(Xa)
1 + exp(Xa)
(3.3)
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where for primary school:
Xa =
pr
0 + 
pr
1  Iftype = highg+  pr2  colored+  pr3  white+
 pr4 Housea +  pr5  IfNFa = 1g+  pr6  IfNFa  2g (3.4)
for secondary school:
Xa =
sec
0 + 
sec
1  Iftype = highg+  sec2  colored+  sec3  white+
 sec4 Housea +  sec5  Ifsec = horg+  sec6  Ifsec = hoag+
 sec7  IfNFa = 1g+  sec8  IfNFa  2g (3.5)
and for college:
Xa =
col
0 + 
col
1  Iftype = highg+  col2  colored+  col3  white+
 col4 Housea +  col5  Ifsec = horg+  col6  Ifsec = hoag+
 col7  Ifha = 1g+  col8  IfNFa = 1g+  col9  IfNFa  2g (3.6)
I denote NF the accumulated number of grades failed since age 12, and House
an indicator equals 1 if individuals co-reside with both biological parents. I allow the
probability to pass a school grade to depend on parental co-residence to account for
di¤erences in household investment in young adults education. For college students,
I further allow the probability to pass a school grade to depend on whether the
individuals work in parallel (and thus may have less time available to invest in their
schooling), and on the type of secondary school they attended (because di¤erent types
of secondary school may reect di¤erent school skills and knowledge).
Parental co-residence is not a choice. Individuals reside with two biological parents
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according to a draw from an exogenous probability rule. I assume that the probability
of co-residing with two biological parents depends on individuals race, age and his
lagged co-residence status:
prob(Housea = 1) =
exp(X )
1 + exp(X )
(3.7)
where,
exp(X ) =  0 +  1  Ifa  17g+  2  Ifa  20g+  3 Housea 1 +
 4  colored+  5  white (3.8)
Conditional on school attendance, individuals receive positive school transfers (tr)
from their households during their secondary and college schooling. School trans-
fers depend on individuals school level, their race and the characteristics of their
households (co-residence status and schooling of households head). The (ln) transfer
equations for individuals at their secondary and college level are given by:
ln trja = 
j
0 + 
j
1  sja + j2 Housea + j3  colored+ j4  white+
j5  Ifeduz  12g+ "tr;ja ; 8j = sec; col (3.9)
where eduz is the schooling of the head of the household at age 12 and "tr is an
age varying transfer shock.
I assume that individuals use the conditional transfers they receive from their
households to pay their school tuitions and that they cannot borrow additional funds
to pay towards tuitions. In college, individuals can supplement their conditional
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school transfers with their work earnings. This implies that individuals in the model
cannot attend secondary schools for which tuition fees are higher than the school
transfers they receive from their households, and they cannot attend college schools for
which college tuition exceeds the combined size of school transfers and wage earnings.
Individuals face the following budget constraint, which is assumed to be satised
every year:
Ca = 12  160 wa ha+(trcola  Tucol)  scola +
X
j=det;hor;hoa
(trseca  Tujsec)  ssec;ja (3.10)
where C is consumption, Tujsec is tuition in type j secondary school, and Tucol is
college tuition. For primary school, tuition costs and school transfers cannot be
identied separately from the utility parameter pr0 in equation 3.12, so 
pr
0 represents
utility net of tuition cost and school transfers.
Individuals derive utility from consumption, school attendance and leisure (L).
Assuming the linearity of the preferences, I can write the periodic utility, ua, as:
ua = Ca + U
pr
a 
X
j
spr;ja + U
sec
a 
X
j
ssec;ja + U
col
a  scola + ULa  La (3.11)
where the periodic utility from primary school Upra is:
Upra = 
pr
0 + 
pr
1  Iftype = highg+ pr2  sa 1 (3.12)
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The periodic utility from secondary school, U seca , is:
U seca = 
sec
0 + 
sec
1  Iftype = highg+ sec2  colored+ sec3  white+
sec4  Ifsec = horg+ sec5  Ifsec = hoag+ sec6  sa 1 +
sec7  Ifa  18g+ sec8  Ifa  20g+
1  Ifpr = detg  Ifsec = horg+ 2  Ifpr = detg  Ifsec = hoag+
3  Ifpr = horg  Ifsec = hoag+ "seca (3.13)
where -s represent transition costs from one type of primary schools to a di¤erent
type of secondary school.
The periodic utility from college U cola is:
U cola = 
col
0 + 
col
1  Iftype = highg+ col2  colored+ col3  white+
col4  ha + col5  sa 1 + "cola (3.14)
and the periodic utility from leisure is:
ULa = 
L
0 + 
L
1  Iftype = highg+ L2  colored+ L3  white++"La (3.15)
where "a = ["pra ; "
sec
a ; "
col
a ; "
L
a ] are age varying preference shocks to primary schooling,
secondary schooling, college and leisure, respectively.
The individual is assumed to maximize the present discounted value of lifetime
utility from age twelve to sixty (A), which is the retirement age in South Africa.
The choice set in each year consists of a subset of the discrete alternatives given by
the Cartesian product s X h. Denoting the choice of the kth element of this set as
dka = 1 (and the choice of any other element as d
k
a = 0), k = 1; :::; K, and the utility
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associated with that choice as uka, the maximized objective function at any age a  12,
Va(
a), is given by:
Va(
a) = max
dka
E
"
AX
=a
A 
KX
k=1
ukd
k
 j
a
#
(3.16)
where E is the expectations operator, 
a is the state space at age a (the relevant
information set with which the individual enters decision age a), and  is the sub-
jective discount factor. The state variables include the level of human capital, work
experience, primary and secondary school types, co-residence status, household heads
schooling, race, accumulated number of school grades failed and the contemporaneous
shocks:

a = fSpra ; Sseca ; Scola ; Ha; pr; sec;Housea; eduz; colored; white;NFa; "ag (3.17)
I assume that the shocks "a = ["wa ; "
tr;sec
a ; "
tr;col
a ; "
pr
a ; "
sec
a ; "
col
a ; "
L
a ] are serially indepen-
dent and uncorrelated, such that "a v N(0;) where all non-diagonal elements of 
are 0. Initial conditions consist of race, household heads schooling, type of primary
school, parental co-residence (at age 12), and accumulated human capital (at age 12).
As individuals in the sample do not work prior to age 12, work experience at age 12
is 0 for all individuals:

12 = fcolored; white; eduz; pr;House12; Spr12 ; H12 = 0g (3.18)
3.1 Solution Method
The maximization problem can be recast in a dynamic programming framework.
In particular, the value function, Va(
a), can be written as the maximum over
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alternative-specic value functions, denoted as V ka (
a) for k = 1; :::K, that satisfy
the Bellman (1957) equation; namely
Va(
a) = max(V
1
a (
a); :::; V
K
a (
a)) (3.19)
where,
V ka (
a) =
8><>: u
k
a + E

Va+1(
a+1)jdka = 1;
a

if a < A
ukA if a = A
(3.20)
where the expectation is taken over the joint distribution of the stochastic shocks
"a+1, grade pass/fail states and a+ 1 household type.
In each period the individual chooses an element from the choice set that is feasible
for him for which the value function is maximized. As seen in (21), future decisions are
assumed to be made optimally for any current choice k. The model does not admit an
analytical solution, but it can be numerically solved in a recursive way from the last
period back to the rst. To solve the model, for every a, I need to rst calculate the
value of E

Va+1(
a+1)jdka = 1;
a

. This needs to be done for every possible k and for
every possible element of 
a. I refer to these functions as the Emax. Full numerical
computation of the Emax functions requires high dimensional integration. Following
Keane and Wolpin (1994), I use Monte Carlo integration to numerically approximate
the Emax functions. That is, I take M draws from the normal distribution of " and
calculate for each draw the maximum of the value functions. The maximum values
are averaged, implying:
EmaxfV 1a+1(
a+1); :::; V Ka+1(
a+1)jdka = 1;
ag =
1
M
MX
m=1
maxf(V 1a+1(
a+1); :::; V Ka+1(
a+1)jdka = 1;
ag (3.21)
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Since I only follow individuals up to age 22, I split the horizon to two sub periods.
For ages 12 to 22, the model is solved explicitly, as described above. The value
function for age 23, V23(
23); is assumed to be a parameterized function of the state
space at age 22. In particular, I assume the following terminal value function:
V23(
23) = 1  IfSpr23 = 8g+
2  Ssec23 + 3  Ssec23  Ifsec = horg+ 4  Ssec23  Ifsec = hoag+
5  Scol23 + 6 H23 (3.22)
3.2 Estimation Method
The numerical solution to the individualsmaximization problem provides approxi-
mations to the Emax functions as indicated in (22). The alternative-specic value
functions, V 1a ; :::; V
K
a for k = 1; ::; K; are known up to the random vector of shocks,
and the implicit shock that determines age a parental co-residence status. Condi-
tional on the deterministic part of the state space, the probability that an individual
is observed to choose option k takes the form of an integral over the region of the
several dimensional error space (depends on what is observed at each period) such
that k is the preferred option.
Specically, in the decision model presented above, the observed outcomes at each
period include: (a) the choice (from the feasible set) made by the individual of whether
or not to attend school, the type of school and whether or not to work (b) the wages
received by the individuals who work (c) the success or failure of individuals who
attend school to complete the school grade (d) parental co-residence status, and (e)
the transfers provided to individuals who attend school.
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Let Oa(n) represent the vector of outcomes of individual n at age a:
Oa(n) = fdka(n); wa(n); passa(n); Housea(n); tra(n)g (3.23)
Also, let I(n) denote the set of initial conditions for this individual (race, heads
schooling, parental co-residence status at age 11, type of primary school, years of
primary school completed by age 12 and whether failed a grade prior to age 12).
Suppose that this individual is observed from age 12 (a0) up to some age a = an,
then the contribution to the likelihood of individual n is given by:
Ln = Pr(Oan(n); Oan 1(n); :::; Oa0(n); I(n)) (3.24)
Given the assumption of joint serial independence among the vector of shocks, the
likelihood function can be written as the product of within-period outcome probabil-
ities:
Ln = 
an
a=a0
Pr(Oa(n)jOa 1(n); :::; Oa0(n); I(n)) (3.25)
To complete the description of the model, I need to specify the functional form
for the unobservable type probabilities. I estimate the model with two unobserved
types (high type and low type). I assume that the unobserved type is known to the
individual but not to the econometrician. The probability that an individual is a high
type depends on a subset of his initial conditions - heads schooling and whether the
individual completed at least six years of schooling by age 12.
prob(type = high) =
exp(X12)
1 + exp(X12)
(3.26)
41
where,
X12 = 0 + 1  Ifeduz  12g+ 2  IfSpr12  6g
Integrating over the type probabilities, the likelihood function can be written as:
Ln =
2X
k=1
ana=a0 Pr(Oa(n)jOa 1(n); :::; Oa0(n); type = k; I(n))  Pr(type = k; I(n))
(3.27)
The overall likelihood for the sample n = 1; ::; N is the product over the individual
likelihoods:
L = Nn=1Ln (3.28)
To illustrate the calculation of the likelihood, suppose that the alternative cho-
sen by individual n is to work without attending school, so that I observe a wage
and a co-residence status at age a: The probability of observing that choice, the
wage and co-residence status outcome conditional on the state space which includes
(Oa(n); Oa 1(n); :::; Oaa(n); I) is:
Pr(ha = 1; wa; Houseaj
a; I) =
Pr(ha = 1jwa; Housea;
a; I)f(waj
a; I) Pr(Houseaj
a; I) (3.29)
where f(waj
a; I) is the wage density.
Similarly, for an individual who chooses to attend primary school of type j at a given
age a, I observe the co-residence status, the school transfer and the school outcome:
Pr(spr;ja = 1; tra; passa; Houseaj
a; I) =
Pr(passajspr;ja ; Housea;
a; I) Pr(spr;ja = 1jtra; Housea;
a; I)
f(trajHousea;
a; I) Pr(Houseaj
a; I) (3.30)
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Probability statements for all other outcomes are obtained in the same manner. Cal-
culation of the conditional probabilities of observing a choice k; (k = 1; :::; K) in the
right hand side of (31) and (32) requires integrating over the preference shocks of all
feasible choices as well as the shocks of feasible outcomes that I do not observe. In-
stead, I use the kernel smoothed frequency simulator proposed by McFadden (1989).
For each set of error term draws, I calculate:
expfV k(a) max(V j(a))

gX
i
expfV i(a) max(V j(a))

g
(3.31)
where V k(a) is the value function associated with the choice made, max(V j(a)) is the
value function associated with the maximal choice, and  is a smoothing parameter.
Notice that the entire set of model parameters enter the likelihood through the
choice probabilities that are computed from the solution of the dynamic programming
problem. Subsets of the parameters also enter through other structural relationships
- wage o¤er function, transfer functions, parental co-residence function, and grade
passing probability functions. The estimation procedure, i.e., the maximization of
the likelihood function, iterates between the solution of the dynamic program and
the calculation of the likelihood.
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Chapter 4
Data
I use data from the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS), a longitudinal study of youth
in metropolitan Cape Town, South Africa. CAPS covers a wide range of outcomes,
including schooling, employment, health, family formation, and intergenerational sup-
port systems. The study was designed as a stratied two-stage clustered sample with
stratication on the predominant population group living in each sample cluster.
Cape Town population in the 2001 census was 48% colored, 32% African, 19% white
and the remaining classied as Indian or other. CAPS oversampled areas classied as
predominantly African and white in order to produce larger samples of African and
white respondents than would be present in a simple random sample.1
CAPS sampled 4,752 youth aged 14-22 from 3,304 households in Wave 1 (2002).
The study currently includes four publicly available waves, the most recent conducted
1However, the percentage of white respndents in the rst wave of CAPS (2002) is only 16%.
CAPS failed to produce a larger sample of whites due to a very low response rate amongst white
respondents. Household response rates were 89% in African areas, 83% in colored areas, and 46% in
white areas. Young adult response rates, conditional on participation of the household, were quite
high, even in white areas. Given household participation, response rates for young adults were 93%
in African areas, 88% in colored areas, and 86% in white areas (Lam, Seekings, and Sparks 2006).
It should be noted that low response rates for white respondents are common in households surveys
in South Africa.
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in 2006. Each of these waves contains a young adult questionnaire and three of
them (waves 1, 3 and 4) also contain household surveys. Crucial to this dissertation,
wave 1 further contains retrospective life histories for each year stretching back to
birth. This includes information on school enrollment, school advancement, household
arrangements and employment. Wave 3 further contains retrospective life history on
the schools young adults attended back to the beginning of their schooling career. In
addition, CAPS contains school-level data, derived from The School Register of Needs
Survey - 2000. This is a survey of nearly 30,000 schools through the secondary level
throughout all South Africa. The survey instrument asks questions relating to school
infrastructure, available equipment and resources, and relevant to this dissertation 
data on the department that served each school during the apartheid regime. Details
about the design of CAPS are provided in Lam et al. (2008).
In this dissertation I make several restrictions to the original sample. First, I
restrict the sample to male youth. Second, I only keep those youth who were 12 years
old or less when the apartheid ended (1994). Older individuals might have already
been attending secondary schools when the apartheid ended, and thus, were not free
to choose a secondary school. Third, I drop individuals who attended private primary
or secondary institutions, individuals who attended new secondary institutions (i.e.,
schools that were founded post-apartheid), and individuals whose school history was
missing or could not be matched to a school department. Fourth, I keep only those
individuals who are observed until at least age 18. Lastly, I drop individuals with
inconsistent histories, individuals who advance two or more grades in a given year,
and individuals without continuous enrolment and/or work histories. With these
constraints the sample size drops to 1420 individuals who I follow from age 12 contin-
uously up to a maximum age of 24. The sample size drops sharply at later ages due
to both the young ages of entry into the panel (i.e., right-censoring) and attrition in
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later waves.2 Since the number of point observations for ages 23 and 24 in the sample
is fairly low, I drop these observations and I only follow individuals up to a maximum
age of 22.
Most relevant to this dissertation is data collected on school choices and outcomes,
employment and wages, conditional school transfers and living arrangements. I use
the retrospective wave 1 data updated with information from waves 2-4 to build
the history of school enrolment, school advancement, employment and parental co-
residence. For each year respondents reported whether they were enrolled in school,
and whether they passed the grade, failed the grade or withdrew before completing
the school year. I dene failureas an event in which respondents did not pass a
school grade, which may include events such as withdrawal (for any reason) rather
than outright academic failure. Enrollment for individuals with less than 12 years
of schooling supersedes labor market participation when these are reported to occur
simultaneously at a given age, in order to keep these choices consistent with their
treatment as mutually exclusive in the model. Work while enrolled never exceeds 2%
during grades 1-12, making me condent that modeling enrollment as distinct from
labor force participation is reasonable.
To construct school department variables, I use data from each wave as well as the
retrospective school history from wave 3 (2005). School names were assigned codes
which I could match to educational school departments in The Register of Needs
Survey (2000). Transition from one school department to another typically occurs
during the transition from primary to secondary school. Consequentially, the model
2The overall rate of attrition in the sample was 17%, with signicant di¤erences across population
groups. The African attrition rate is 21%, with most of the attrition resulting from migration back
to the rural Eastern Cape province that is the main sending region for Africans living in Cape
Town. The colored population has its roots primarily in Cape Town, a factor contributing to its
lower 10% attrition rate. The 23% attrition rate for whites includes both migration out of Cape
Town (including migration out of South Africa) and a signicant number of refusals.
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allows transition from one school department to another to occur only during this
time. Individuals who switched school departments during their primary or secondary
school education were assigned the department of the school they attended for most
years.
Information on wages is included in the young adult questionnaire in each wave.
Wages are full-time annual equivalent based on 160 working hours per month. Hourly
wages are calculated from actual number of hours reported. Individuals are considered
to be working if they report working more than 20 hours per-week. Intergenerational
school transfers are included in each household questionnaire. Education of the head
of the household is the schooling of the father, if the father was a member of the
household when young adult was 12 years old. It is the schooling of the mother, if the
mother, but not the father, was a member of the household when young adult was
12 years old. It is the schooling of a grandparent if young adult co-resided with this
grandparent, but without biological parents, when he was 12 years old. Otherwise,
schooling of the head of the household is missing.
4.1 Data Description
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the sample. The close number of African and
colored respondents is the result of the intentional over-sampling of African areas,
while the under-representation of white respondents is the result of a low response
rate and the higher attrition rates of whites. Striking di¤erences amongst races are
already evident at age 12. While more than 80% of the whites had completed 6 years of
schooling by this age, this is true for only 61% of the coloreds and 24% of the Africans.
These di¤erences translate into a large racial gap in age 12 completed schooling, with
Africans lagging about 1.5 grades behind whites, and coloreds lagging about 0.3 grades
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behind whites. Youth from di¤erent races also di¤er in the characteristics of their
households. Whites, on average, live in households whose heads are signicantly more
educated than coloreds and Africans, and while 73% of the whites live in households
with two biological parents, this is only true for 59% of the coloreds and 40% of the
Africans in the sample.
Table 1 further shows striking racial di¤erences in schooling outcomes at age 23.
While 93% of the whites complete 12 years of schooling by this age, this is only true
for 42% of the coloreds and 38% of the African respondents. Table 1 also suggests
a di¢ cult transition from school to work for African men. While 81% of the colored
and 77% of the white respondents had worked by age 23, this is only true for 29% of
the Africans. Also, age 22 mean wage for whites is about 150% higher than that of
Africans, and about 80% higher than that of coloreds.
Figure 1 shows the proportions of African, colored and white respondents who
were enrolled in school or post-secondary institution at each age from 12 to 22. Up to
age 15, enrollment rates are close to or above 90% for all three race groups. Colored
enrollment rates begin to fall above age 15, with Africans having higher enrollment
rates than colored youth at all ages above 15. African enrollment rates are still high
in their late teens with enrollment rates around 85% at age 17 and 70% at age 18.
White enrollment drops sharply at age 18 when the vast majority of whites complete
12 years of schooling.
Figure 2 shows the proportions of African, colored and white respondents attend-
ing each of the three types of secondary school departments. The vast majority of
youth who are in secondary school attend schools that are predominately of their
race, with 97% of the whites attending former-white secondary schools, 84% of the
coloreds attending former-colored secondary schools, and 86% of the Africans attend-
ing former-African secondary schools.
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Figure 3 shows the mean grades completed by African, colored and white respon-
dents at each age from 12 to 23. The gure shows that whites advance, on average,
almost one grade of school per year up to age 18. Grade advancement for Africans
is slower. By age 16, the schooling gap between whites and Africans is close to two
full grades, and by age 20 - 2.5 grades. Coloreds have the slowest grade advancement
of all three races. Largely due to the high enrollment rates for Africans in their late
teens, African grade attainment almost catches up with colored grade attainment by
age 21. By age 23, both Africans and coloreds lag about 2.8 grades behind whites.
One of the valuable features of CAPS is that it provides direct measures of grade
repetition. Figure 4 shows the cumulative number of grades failed in school or post-
secondary institutions for Africans, coloreds and whites at each age from 12 to 23.
Despite higher enrolment rates for Africans at each age above 13, coloreds fail, on
average, more grades than Africans up to age 18. Above age 18, Africans have a
higher cumulative number of grades failed than colored because school enrolment
for coloreds is signicantly lower than that of Africans at these ages. For whites,
the cumulative number of grades failed is signicantly lower than that of Africans
and coloreds. By age 23, whites fail, on average, 0.4 school grades, coloreds fail, on
average, 1.05 school grades, and Africans fail, on average, 1.45 school grades.
Figure 5 shows the proportions of African, colored and white respondents who
are employed at each age from 12 to 22. Employment rates are negligible for all
races up to age 15 because enrolment is almost universal at these ages. For ages
16 and above colored employment rates are always above those of whites, though
this mainly reects right-censoring of school careers for whites rather than failure
in the job search. At age 22, about 70% of the coloreds and 60% of the whites are
employed. Africans experience an arduous transition from school to work. They have
extremely low rates of work, with employment rates never exceeding 10% below age
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20. Moreover, their employment rate is lower than 30% at age 22, although only 13%
of the Africans are still enrolled in school at this age.
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Chapter 5
Estimation Results
I estimate a model with 99 parameters. The parameter estimates and standard errors
are displayed in Table 2. In this section I discuss the parameters that are of greatest
interest, highlighting those related to apartheid school departments and race that
are informative for the counterfactual experiments I perform later. Other parameters
have obvious signs and reasonable magnitudes.
5.1 School Quality Related Parameters
The estimates show that utility ow from attending secondary school is highest for
former white schools and lowest for former African schools. The consumption value of
Individuals attending former white (colored) secondary schools is 17,316 (7,107) rand
higher than for individuals attending former African secondary schools. In addition,
individuals attending better quality secondary schools are also more likely to pass
their current grade in school, and they are more likely to pass a grade in college. The
logistic functions imply, for instance, that the probability of a typicalAfrican, that
is a low type who lives without at least one biological parent, and failed one grade in
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school since age 12, to pass a grade in a former African, a former colored or a former
white secondary school is 59%, 64% and 67%, respectively, and his probability to pass
a grade in college is 68%, 79% and 81%, respectively.
The estimates also report higher return to schooling for former white and former
colored secondary schools. An additional year in a former white (colored) secondary
school increases the o¤ered wage by about 6% (5%), whereas an additional year in a
former African secondary school increases the o¤ered wage by about 3%.
Consistent with the literature, the estimates also show large di¤erences in sec-
ondary school tuitions by school department. Estimated tuitions are 84 rand for
former African secondary schools, 269 rand for former colored secondary schools, and
1300 rand for former white secondary schools. Ladd and Fiske (2004) report simi-
lar average annual school tuitions for former African and former colored secondary
schools in the Western Cape province based on actual tuition data obtained from the
South African Ministry of Education (105 rand for former African schools, and 333
rand for former colored schools). However, they calculate that the average annual
school fees in former white secondary schools in the Western Cape province is 2701,
which is substantially higher than the value I estimate. It is likely that the low par-
ticipation rates of whites in the survey, and in particular the low response rates of
whites in the wealthier neighborhoods of Cape Town contributed to this outcome.
5.2 Race-related Parameters
Utility function parameters: The estimates report substantial di¤erences in utility
ows from leisure and school attendance amongst races. Whites receive the highest
utility ow from leisure while coloreds receive the lowest utility ow from leisure
(consumption utility from leisure for whites is 3,950 rand higher than that of Africans,
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and consumption utility from leisure for coloreds is 1,393 rand lower than that of
Africans). The estimates further show that Africans receive the highest utility ow
from attending secondary school and college, while whites receive the lowest utility
ow from attending secondary school (14,727 rand lower than coloreds and 30,794
lower than Africans), and coloreds receive the lowest utility ow from attending college
(13,483 rand lower than coloreds and 18,395 rand lower than Africans).
Labor market parameters: The estimates imply that Africans and coloreds, ceteris
paribus, receive wage o¤ers that are 50% and 8% lower than those of whites. This
may reect discrimination in the labor market, that is, lower skill rental prices for
Africans and (to much lesser extent) for coloreds and/or that African and (to much
lesser extent) colored youth have lower skill endowments at age 12 independent of
type.
School progress: The estimates show that whites have the highest probability to
pass a grade in secondary school, and Africans - the lowest. For example, while a
white young man who is a low type, attends a former white secondary school, did
not fail a grade in school since age 12, and co-resides with two biological parents,
passes a grade with a probability of 97%, the probabilities of comparable colored and
African men to pass a grade in a former white secondary school are 87% and 85%,
respectively. Di¤erences amongst races at the college level are marginal.
Unobserved heterogeneity, initial endowments and race: I estimate a model with
two latent types, nding this number is su¢ cient for the model to provide a reasonable
t to all the key features of the data that I am interested in. In the model, unobserved
heterogeneity a¤ects behavior through its e¤ect on preferences to schooling and labor
and through its e¤ect on school and labor skill endowments. The estimates show that
high type young adults receive higher utility from school attendance during primary
school (33,516 rand more than comparable low type individuals), secondary school
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(6475 rand more than comparable low type individuals), and college (3,059 rand more
than comparable low type individuals). High type young adults also receive higher
utility from leisure (18,038 rand more than otherwise identical low type individuals).
High type individuals are further estimated to have o¤er wages about 55% higher
than comparable low type youth, and to have higher school skill endowments (i.e.,
higher probability to pass a grade in school conditional on attendance) in all phases
of education. For instance while the probability of an African who is a low type who
lives without at least one biological parent, and failed one grade in school since age
12, to pass a grade in a former African, a former colored or a former white secondary
school is 59%, 64% and 67%, respectively, the probability of a comparable high type
individual to pass a grade in school is 88%, 91%, 92%, respectively.
The logit function expresses type probabilities as a function of (a) initial schooling
endowment - whether the individual completed at least 6 years of schooling by age 12,
and, (b) schooling of the head of the household - whether the head of the household
completed at least 12 years of schooling. Simulating the model, I nd that 23% of
the individuals who completed at least 6 years of schooling by age 12 are high type,
while only 11% of those who completed less than 6 years of schooling by age 12 are
high type. Similarly, the estimates imply that 30% of the individuals whose head of
the household has schooling level of 12 years or above are high type, while this is true
for only 13% of the individuals whose head of the household has less than 12 years of
schooling.
Since initial endowments are highly correlated with race, colored and African
young men are under-represented amongst the high skill endowment type. Simulating
the model I nd that 29% of the whites, 17% of the coloreds, and 13% of the Africans
are high endowment type.
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5.3 Model Fit
Model t is displayed in Tables 3 to 8. The model captures fairly well all the main
features of the data.
School Enrolment: Fit for enrolment rates by age is displayed in Table 3. The
model ts well the enrolment patterns for all three races. It captures the high enrol-
ment levels (above 90%) for Africans at ages younger than 16, and the gradual decline
in enrolment for Africans from age 17. The model predicts that enrolment rates for
Africans at ages 18, 20 and 22 are 72%, 43% and 19%, respectively, while the actual
enrolment rates at these ages are 71%, 39% and 14%. The model also ts well the en-
rolment patterns for coloreds, with enrolment levels below those of Africans at every
age from 13 to 22, and it captures the steep drop in colored enrollment above age 16.
The model further predicts well the enrolment patterns for whites with enrollment
rates above 90% for all whites younger than 17, and it captures the steep decline
in enrollment for whites from age 18. The model predicts that enrolment levels for
whites at ages 18, 20 and 22 are 68%, 39% and 25%, respectively, while the actual
enrolment rates at these ages are 64%, 43% and 26%, respectively.
Choice of Secondary School Department: Fit for the proportions of African, col-
ored and white youth attending former African, former colored and former white
secondary schools is displayed in Table 4. The model captures well the racial persis-
tence in choices of secondary school departments. The model predicts that 85% of the
Africans attend former African secondary schools, 81% of the coloreds attend former
colored secondary schools, and 100% of the whites attend former white secondary
schools, while the actual proportions are 86%, 85%, and 97%, respectively.
Employment. Fit for employment rates by age is displayed in Table 5. The model
ts well the employment patterns for all three races. The model captures well the
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very low employment rates for Africans at all ages below 18 (1% or less). It further
captures that the proportions of employed Africans never exceed 10% before age 20.
At age 22, the model predicts that 24% of the Africans are employed, while the actual
proportions of Africans working at this age is 28%. The model also captures very well
the employment patterns for coloreds. The model predicts that the proportions of
coloreds working is 10% or less below age 17, and it captures the sharp increase in
employment rates from age 18 and above. At age 22, the model predicts that 70% of
the coloreds are employed, which is also the actual rate of coloreds employed at this
age. Similarly, the model captures fairly well the proportions of whites employed at
each age from 12 to 22, and it captures that colored employment rates exceed those
of whites at each age from 12 to 22.
School Advancement and Completion: Fit for mean years of completed schooling
by age, and school attainment distribution at age 23 are displayed in Tables 6 and 7,
respectively. Table 6 shows that the model captures well the mean years of completed
schooling at every age from 12 to 22 for all three races. Mean school attainment at
age 23 predicted by the model is 10.47 years for Africans, 10.48 years for coloreds,
and 13.30 years for whites, while actual mean completed schooling at this age is
10.43, 10.47, and 13.25 years for Africans, coloreds and whites, respectively. Table 7
shows that while the model ts well the school attainment distribution of Africans,
it does not t those of coloreds and whites as well as it ts the mean. The model
under-estimates colored school graduation rates by about 9 percent-points, and while
it predicts fairly well white school graduation rates, it over-predicts the percentage
of whites who complete more than 12 years of schooling by about 12 percent-points.
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Chapter 6
Counterfactual Experiments
6.1 Accounting for Racial Di¤erences in Schooling
Outcomes
§5.2 show that Africans, colored and white youth di¤er in their initial endowments, as
well as in their structural parameters. In this section, I address whether and to what
extent these di¤erences account for racial di¤erences in schooling outcomes. Specif-
ically, I perform two set of counterfactual experiments. The rst, involves altering
initial endowments distributions, and the second, involves altering race parameters
related to labor market and preferences to schooling and leisure. Each experiment
reveals how close the outcomes for Africans and coloreds would be to those of whites
if each category of parameters, taken one at a time, were set equal to those of white
men.
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6.1.1 The Role of Initial Endowments
Table 8 shows what would have happened, according to the models predictions, to
racial gaps in schooling outcomes at age 23 if age 12 endowment distributions were
equalized to those of whites. The rst column presents the (simulated) baseline
situation: by age 23, 96% of the whites are school graduates while this is true for 35%
of the Africans and 33% of the coloreds. In addition, mean educational attainment
at age 23 for both Africans and coloreds is about 2.8 years less than that of whites.
Column (ii) reports an experiment in which Africans and coloreds had the same
age 12 parental co-residence distribution as whites. With this experiments age 23
mean schooling attainment increases by 0.1 years for Africans and by 0.04 years for
coloreds. The experiment also reports an increase of about 3 percent-points in school
graduation rates for Africans and of about 1 percent-point for coloreds.
The second experiment (column iii) assumes that Africans and coloreds have the
same parent-education distributions as whites. I nd that mean age 23 school attain-
ment increases by about 0.2 years for both Africans and coloreds. This represents a
decrease of about 7% in the original African-white and colored-white school attain-
ment gap.
The third experiment (column iv) assumes that Africans and coloreds have the
same age 12 initial schooling distributions as whites. I nd that equalizing initial
schooling distributions would cause the mean schooling di¤erence between whites
and Africans to fall by 29%. Furthermore, the percentage of Africans who graduate
from school increases by 15 percent-points. The impact of this experiment on colored
youth is much smaller: mean schooling di¤erence between whites and coloreds falls
by 8%, and the percentage of school graduates increases by about 3 percent-points.
The last experiment (column v) combines all previous experiments, that is, this
experiment shows what would have happened, according to the models predictions,
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to racial gaps in schooling outcomes at age 23, if all age 12 endowment distributions
of Africans and coloreds were equalized to those of whites. I nd that with this
experiment, the percentage of Africans (coloreds) who graduate from school by age
23 increases by 20 (6) percent-points. The experiment leads to a reduction in the
mean schooling di¤erential of 40% for Africans and 16% for coloreds. This reduction in
mean schooling di¤erentials, though signicant, is still smaller than the 70% reduction
found for black males in the U.S. (Keane and Wolpin 2000).
6.1.2 Equalizing Race Parameters
Table 9 shows what would have happened according to the models predictions, to
race di¤erences in schooling outcomes at age 23, if race parameters of African and
colored youth were equalized to those of whites. As before, the rst column presents
the (simulated) baseline situation.
Column (ii) reports an experiment in which wage equation race parameters are
equalized to that of whites. With this intervention, African experience a dramatic
surge in employment - employment rates at age 22 increase by 30 percent-points
Consequentially, high-school graduation rates of Africans drop by 8 percent-points,
and age 23 mean schooling drops substantially - a drop of 0.56 years. The impact
of this intervention on colored youth is more modest: employment rates increase by
about 6 percent-points, graduation rates decrease by about 1.5 percent-points, and
mean schooling at age 23 decreases by 0.08 years. This experiment suggests that
though counter-intuitive, labor market discrimination helps in this case to mitigate
racial di¤erences in education, especially for Africans, because with less attractive
labor market opportunities individuals stay longer in school.
Column (iii) reports an experiment in which preferences to schooling and leisure
of Africans and coloreds are equalized to those of whites. Since the estimates report
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that the utility of whites from secondary school is substantially lower than that of
Africans and coloreds, this intervention has a substantial adverse e¤ect on schooling of
both Africans and coloreds: African mean schooling at age 23 drops by 2.6 years and
colored mean schooling at age 23 drops by 1.6 years. African and colored employment
rates, too, drop dramatically - 10 percent-point and 37 percent-points, respectively.
This is because the estimates report that utility from leisure is highest for whites and
lowest for coloreds.
Column (iv) reports an experiment in which Africans and coloreds have the same
probability to complete a grade in school (all else equal). This experiment has a very
large impact on schooling outcomes for both Africans and coloreds, as it eliminates
45% of the African-white gap in years of schooling and 35% of the colored-white gap
in years of schooling. With this experiment 66% of Africans and 60% of the coloreds
graduate from school, and 31% of the Africans and 24% of the coloreds complete at
least some college.
6.2 Policy Interventions
I next use the estimated model to explore whether nancial constraints enhance racial
disparities in education by analyzing how di¤erent school tuition policies a¤ect school-
ing outcomes and the racial gap in education. To perform these policy interventions,
I use the model to simulate choices and outcomes with a modied budget constraint
as implied by the intervention I consider.
Tables 10-13 summarize the e¤ects of four school tuition interventions on school-
ing outcomes of African, colored and whites. The rst column in each table presents
the (simulated) baseline situation, and columns (ii) to (v) in each table present the re-
sults for the four interventions I consider: abolishing tuitions in all secondary schools,
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abolishing tuitions only in former colored and former African secondary schools, abol-
ishing tuitions only in former African secondary schools, and abolishing tuitions in
post-secondary schools (but not at earlier phases of education). Table 10 presents
the results for mean completed schooling by age, Table 11 presents the results for en-
rollment rates by age, Table 12 presents the results for secondary school department
choices, and Table 13 presents the results for school attainment distribution at age
23.
Abolishing tuitions in all secondary schools (column ii): This policy has a dramatic
impact on schooling outcomes for Africans and coloreds, and a relatively small impact
on schooling outcomes for whites. The policy dramatically alters the choices Africans
and coloreds make regarding the school department they attend at secondary school
(Table 12). With this intervention all Africans and coloreds attending secondary
schools choose to attend former white schools. Table 11 reveals a substantial increase
in African and colored school enrolment at every age from 12 to 22. Table 10 reveals
a substantial increase in mean completed years of schooling for both Africans and
coloreds. By age 23, mean school attainment for Africans and coloreds are 11.86 and
11.67, respectively, which represents a reduction of 49% and 42%, respectively, in
the original schooling gap. This policy has also pronounced e¤ect on school gradu-
ation rates for Africans and coloreds (Table 13). By age 23, their secondary school
completion rates double (rates are now 69% and 67%, respectively), and 30% of the
Africans and 24% of the coloreds complete at least some college. However, removal
of secondary school tuitions has a relatively small e¤ect on schooling outcomes for
whites, as whites have high enrollment rates and high school completion rates already
prior to the intervention. With this intervention, school completion rates for whites
increase by 2 percent-points (Table 13), and mean schooling at age 23 increases by
0.08 years (Table 10). This policy is, thus, e¤ective in substantially reducing racial
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disparities in education.
Abolishing tuitions in former African and colored schools (column iii): This policy
has a substantial impact on school outcomes for Africans (though lesser than in the
previous experiment where no tuitions are charged in all secondary schools), a small
impact on school outcomes for coloreds, and no impact on school outcomes for whites.
With this intervention 98% of the Africans attending secondary schools choose to
attend former colored schools (Table 12). For coloreds, too, school choice distribution
is more concentrated in former colored schools than in the baseline model, with no
coloreds attending African schools and a lower percentage of coloreds attending former
white secondary schools. Table 11 reports an increase in African and colored school
enrolment at each age from 12 to 22 (compared with the baseline model). The increase
in enrollment for Africans is more substantial than for coloreds, but in both cases, the
e¤ects are lesser than in the experiment where no tuitions are charged in all secondary
schools. Table 10 reveals a substantial increase in mean completed years of schooling
for Africans and a smaller increase for coloreds. By age 23, mean school attainment for
Africans and coloreds are 11.10 and 10.74, respectively, which represents a reduction
of 22% and 9%, respectively, in the schooling gap. By age 23, 50% of the Africans
and 40% of the coloreds complete at least 12 years of schooling, an increase of 17
percent-points and 6 percent-points, respectively (Table 13).
Abolishing tuitions in former African secondary schools (column iv): This inter-
vention has a small impact on school outcomes for Africans, and no impact on school
outcomes for coloreds and whites. With this intervention, age 23 mean schooling
attainment for Africans increases by 0.09 years (Table 10), and the percentage of
Africans who complete at least 12 years of schooling increases by about 2 percent-
points (Table 13). This policy, thus, yields a small reduction in the schooling gap
between Africans and whites, and no improvement in the schooling gap between col-
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oreds and whites.
Abolishing post-secondary school tuitions, while secondary school tuitions remain
unchanged (column v): This policy has a very small e¤ect on the percentage of
school graduates for all three races (an increase of less than 1 percent-point), but it
increases the proportions of those completing more than 12 years of schooling within
the school graduates (Table 13). The percentage of Africans completing more than
12 years of schooling increases by 2.6 percent-points, and the percentage of coloreds
completing more than 12 years of schooling increases by 1.4 percent-points. The
percentage of whites completing more than 12 years of schooling increases by about
3.3 percent-points. With this intervention, by age 23, mean completed schooling of
Africans increases by 0.07 years and mean completed schooling of coloreds - by 0.04
years (Table 10).The impact on whites is bigger (0.13 years). Because whites benet
more from removal of tuitions at the college level, this policy ends increasing racial
disparities in schooling, though not by much.
63
Chapter 7
Conclusions
Racial disparities in education in South-Africa are large and well documented in the
literature. However, moving beyond simple descriptions of these disparities to a more
detailed explanation has proven to be elusive. This paper develops and estimates a
dynamic model of schooling and labor supply of youth in South-Africa, and uses it to
study several potential explanations for racial disparities in education, and policies
aimed to ameliorate them.
I nd that Africans, coloreds, and whites di¤er substantially in their structural
parameters, but that these di¤erences do not necessarily translate into a bigger school-
ing gap. For example, whites receive wage o¤ers that are 50% higher than those of
comparable Africans, and 8% higher than those of comparable coloreds. Nontheless,
wage discrimination is found to mitigate racial disparities in schooling, in particular
for African men. I nd that if African and colored wage o¤ers were equalized to
those of whites, school enrollment would decrease, and age 23 schooling would drop
by 0.56 years for Africans and by 0.08 years for coloreds. This is because with inferior
labor market opportunities, coloreds and, in particular, Africans increase their school
enrollment. Similarly, I nd that although African, colored and white South-Africans
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di¤er substantially in their preferences to schooling and leisure, these di¤erences do
not contribute to racial disparities in schooling, rather, they mitigate them. On the
other hand, I nd that apartheid heritage explains 40% of the African-white gap in
years of schooling, and 16% of the colored-white gap in years of schooling.
My ndings further highlight the role of nancial constraints as major contribu-
tors to racial disparities in education. I nd that abolishing secondary school fees in
all secondary schools will eliminate 49% of the schooling gap between African and
whites and 42% of the schooling gap between coloreds and whites. Moreover, with
this intervention, secondary school completion rates double. On the other hand, elim-
inating school fees only in former African secondary schools will have a small e¤ect
on African enrollment and school completion (an increase of 0.09 years of schooling),
and will have no e¤ect on colored schooling. This nding suggests that nancial
constrains in this case a¤ect human capital primarily via school quality choices and
not via school attendance decisions. This linkage, that has rarely been addressed in
previous research casts serious doubts on the e¤ectiveness of policies aimed to reduce
tuitions in low quality schools in mitigating racial disparities in education. The nd-
ings further suggest that nancial constraints are more important at the secondary
school level than they are in college. Abolishing school fees at the post-secondary
school level without altering secondary school fees will mostly benet the white pop-
ulation (average increase of 0.13 years of schooling), and will have a smaller e¤ect on
Africans and coloreds, suggesting that intervention at post-secondary school level will
only reinforce the already overwhelming racial gap in education, while intervention
at the secondary school level can dramatically decrease racial gaps in education.
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Appendix A
Tables
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics (Std. Deviation in Parentheses)
African Colored White
Number of individuals 600 668 152
At Age 12
Mean schooling (yrs)
4.41
(1.44)
5.56
(1.02)
5.88
(0.51)
Completed at least 6 years (%)
23.83
(42.64)
61.07
(48.79)
80.26
(39.93)
Co-reside with 2 biological parents (%)
39.83
(48.99)
58.68
(49.27)
73.02
(44.52)
Household heads schooling  12 (%) 9.99 13.91 79.59
At Age 23
Mean schooling (yrs)
10.43
(2.19)
10.48
(2.35)
13.25
(1.47)
Schooling Distribution (%):
1.40
(1.06)
0.98
(0.90)
0.40
(0.79)
< 9 yrs 16.80 19.81 0
9 - 11 yrs 45.10 38.21 7.09
12 yrs 26.85 30.19 36.33
> 12 yrs 11.25 11.79 56.58
Cumulative grades failed (yrs)
1.40
(1.06)
0.98
(0.90)
0.40
(0.79)
Ever worked (%)
29.2
(40.7)
81.1
(39.2)
77.2
(42.8)
Hourly wage (Rand)
11.44
(13.07)
15.61
(8.36)
28.39
(21.02)
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Table A.2: Estimated Parameter Values
Prob. to Pass a Grade - Primary School
constant ( pr0 )
High Type ( pr1 )
Colored ( pr2 )
White ( pr3 )
Co-reside with two parents ( pr4 )
Failed one grade ( pr5 )
Failed two or more grades ( pr6 )
Estimate S.E.
2.131 0.362
0.615 0.281
0.31 0.243
1.333 0.473
0.173 0.042
-0.474 0.159
-1 0.278
Prob. to Pass a Grade - Secondary School
constant ( sec0 )
High Type ( sec1 )
Colored ( sec2 )
White ( sec3 )
Co-reside with two parents ( sec4 )
Secondary School - Former Colored ( sec5 )
Secondary School - Former White ( sec6 )
Failed one grade ( sec7 )
Failed two or more grades ( sec8 )
1.231 0.265
1.673 0.495
0.126 0.171
1.679 0.637
0.211 0.069
0.221 0.039
0.355 0.110
-0.864 0.266
-1.744 0.311
Prob. to Pass a Grade - College
constant ( col0 )
High Type ( col1 )
Colored ( col2 )
White ( col3 )
Co-reside with two parents ( col4 )
Secondary School - Former Colored ( col5 )
Secondary School - Former White ( col6 )
Work while in school ( col7 )
Failed one grade or more ( col8 )
Failed two or more grades ( col9 )
0.826 0.369
0.023 0.036
0.034 0.013
0.042 0.014
0.488 0.144
0.608 0.218
0.705 0.304
-0.589 0.132
-0.085 0.031
-1.572 0.351
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Table A.2 - continued
Probability to Reside with two parents
constant ( 0)
Age 17 to 20 ( 1)
Age  21 ( 2)
Co-resided with two parents in the previous year ( 3)
Colored ( 4)
White ( 5)
Estimate S.E
-4.12 0.11
-0.38 0.09
-0.66 0.16
6.84 0.11
0.41 0.10
0.23 0.15
Ln. Wage
constant (0)
High Type (1)
Colored (2)
White (3)
Year in Primary School (4)
Year in Secondary School (5)
Year in Secondary School - Former Colored (6)
Year in Secondary School - Former White (7)
Year in College (8)
Work Experience (9)
Worked in previous year (10)
Age (11)
wage S.E
0.538 0.154
0.438 0.221
0.348 0.082
0.403 0.09
0.025 0.012
0.031 0.011
0.017 0.005
0.031 0.013
0.093 0.034
0.056 0.031
-0.37 0.112
0.048 0.012
0.522 0.214
Type Probabilities
constant (0)
Parent schooling: 12 yrs (1)
Completed 6 yrs or more(2)
-2.272 0.631
0.895 0.271
0.732 0.238
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Table A.2 - continued
Utility Parameters - Leisure
constant (L0 )
High Type (L1 )
Colored (L2 )
White (L3 )
Error S.E.
Estimate S.E.
33,568 6,412
18,038 10,183
-1,392 2,721
3,949 2,220
8,148 3,403
Utility Parameters - Primary School
constant (pr0 )
High Type (pr1 )
Enrolled in previous year (pr2 )
Error S.E.
1,971 660
33,515 815
33,765 5,547
8,875 5,099
Utility Parameters - Secondary School
constant (sec0 )
High Type (sec1 )
Colored (sec2 )
White (sec3 )
Secondary: Former Colored (sec4 )
Secondary: Former White (sec5 )
Age  18 (sec6 )
Age  20 (sec7 )
Enrolled in previous year (sec8 )
Switching cost: DET to HOR ( 1)
Switching cost: DET to HOA ( 2)
Switching cost: HOR to HOA ( 3)
Error S.E.
17,309 3,782
6,474 1,845
-16,067 6,827
-30,794 658
7,107 3,927
17,316 5,446
-6,519 2,863
-1,461 1,200
22,948 6,178
-10,595 6,384
-19,369 5,479
-12,720 1,054
8,346 3,885
Utility Parameters - College
constant (col0 )
High Type (col1 )
Colored (col2 )
White (col3 )
Work while in school (col4 )
Enrolled in previous year (col5 )
Error S.E
-20,859 8,485
3,059 1,524
-18,394 5,797
-4,911 942
-40,493 1,599
18,874 5,591
25,111 7,058
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Table A.2 - continued
Ln. Transfer, Secondary School
constant (0)
Co-reside with two parents (1)
Parent schooling:  12 yrs (2)
Colored (3)
White (4)
Error S.E
Estimate S.E.
5.798 0.047
0.068 0.063
0.564 0.088
0.852 0.068
2.309 0.124
0.759
Ln. Tranfer, College
constant (5)
Co-reside with two parents (6)
Parent schooling:  12 yrs (7)
Colored (8)
White (9)
Error S.E.
8.21 0.175
0.244 0.181
0.347 0.211
0.526 0.237
0.626 0.284
0.908
Secondary School Tuitions
DET
HOR
HOA
85 65
269 24
1300 98
College Tuition 1690 19
Terminal Values
completed 8 years of schooling (1)
Year in Secondary School (5)
Year in Secondary School - Former Colored (6)
Year in Secondary School - Former White (7)
Year in College (8)
Year of work experience (8)
235 210
10,120 1,803
8,580 1,806
24,775 3,084
38,057 5,817
18,946 9,005
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Table A.3: Model Fit - Enrollment Rates by Age (%)
Age
African
Data Model
Colored
Data Model
White
Data Model
12 98.50 98.80 98.80 98.98 100 99.71
13 98.33 97.93 98.50 97.16 100 99.23
14 97.50 95.78 96.25 91.84 100 96.32
15 95.33 93.20 89.56 85.04 99.34 94.89
16 90.66 90.05 79.64 78.81 99.34 95.23
17 84.83 84.56 57.33 65.20 89.47 91.84
18 71.00 72.40 35.83 39.58 63.81 67.82
19 54.66 57.87 18.96 19.23 52.58 48.98
20 38.37 42.68 14.01 9.95 43.34 38.51
21 21.57 30.86 9.06 6.56 33.33 33.90
22 13.52 18.68 7.54 4.98 26.27 25.34
Table A.4: Model Fit - Secondary School Department Choice (%)
School De-
partment
African
Data Model
Colored
Data Model
White
Data Model
DET (Former African) 86.17 85.39 1.42 0.84 0 0
HOR (Former Colored) 11.42 12.76 84.68 81.05 2.76 0.02
HOA (Former White) 2.41 1.83 13.90 18.10 97.24 99.98
Table A.5: Model Fit - Employment Rates by Age (%)
Age
African
Data Model
Colored
Data Model
White
Data Model
12 0 0 0 0.04 0 0
13 0 0.02 0.15 0.16 0 0.05
14 0 0.08 0.9 0.98 0 0.1
15 0 0.16 2.10 2.89 0 0.56
16 0 0.36 7.69 5.91 0.66 0.71
17 1.0 0.81 16.92 13.42 6.58 3.55
18 3.24 2.52 34.58 30.32 26.32 26.81
19 6.29 6.81 46.41 52.31 40.51 49.57
20 11.63 11.50 60.57 61.07 52.33 56.17
21 19.83 19.65 64.40 62.68 57.41 57.23
22 27.69 23.59 69.89 69.55 60.09 59.18
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Table A.6: Model Fit - Mean Completed Shooling by Age (yrs)
Age
African
Data Model
Colored
Data Model
White
Data Model
12 4.41 4.41 5.56 5.56 5.88 5.88
13 5.31 5.30 6.49 6.44 6.85 6.85
14 6.21 6.18 7.37 7.29 7.84 7.82
15 7.07 7.02 8.17 8.07 8.80 8.76
16 7.88 7.80 8.89 8.78 9.76 9.69
17 8.62 8.51 9.46 9.40 10.71 10.61
18 9.24 9.13 9.87 9.90 11.61 11.50
19 9.69 9.61 10.14 10.19 12.20 12.11
20 10.07 9.96 10.31 10.32 12.63 12.51
21 10.35 10.20 10.45 10.40 12.9 12.83
22 10.40 10.37 10.48 10.45 13.09 13.10
23 10.43 10.47 10.48 10.49 13.25 13.30
Table A.7: Model Fit - School Attainment at age 23 (%)
Completed
Schooling
African
Data Model
Colored
Data Model
White
Data Model
< 9 yrs 16.8 14.43 19.81 13.69 0 0
9 - 11 yrs 45.10 49.64 38.21 52.93 6.09 3.55
12 yrs 26.85 21.95 30.19 20.38 36.33 26.19
>12 yrs. 11.25 13.98 11.79 13.0 57.58 70.26
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Table A.10: Removal of Tuitions - Mean Completed Schooling by Age
Age
Baseline
Model
(i)
All
Sec.
(ii)
African
& Colored
Sec.
(iii)
African
Sec.
(iv)
College
(v)
African 12 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.41
13 5.30 5.31 5.31 5.30 5.30
14 6.18 6.21 6.20 6.19 6.18
15 7.02 7.09 7.05 7.03 7.02
16 7.80 7.94 7.88 7.82 7.81
17 8.51 8.77 8.66 8.54 8.52
18 9.13 9.54 9.36 9.17 9.14
19 9.61 10.21 9.94 9.66 9.62
20 9.96 10.78 10.39 10.03 9.99
21 10.20 11.23 10.71 10.28 10.24
22 10.37 11.59 10.95 10.45 10.42
23 10.47 11.86 11.10 10.56 10.54
Colored 12 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56
13 6.44 6.45 6.44 6.44 6.44
14 7.29 7.32 7.29 7.29 7.29
15 8.07 8.17 8.10 8.07 8.07
16 8.78 9.00 8.85 8.78 8.78
17 9.40 9.81 9.54 9.40 9.41
18 9.90 10.52 10.10 9.90 9.91
19 10.19 11.01 10.41 10.19 10.21
20 10.32 11.30 10.57 10.32 10.35
21 10.40 11.48 10.65 10.40 10.43
22 10.45 11.59 10.70 10.45 10.48
23 10.49 11.67 10.74 10.49 10.53
White 12 5.88 5.88 5.88 5.88 5.88
13 6.85 6.85 6.85 6.85 6.85
14 7.82 7.83 7.82 7.82 7.82
15 8.76 8.78 8.76 8.76 8.77
16 9.69 9.74 9.69 9.69 9.69
17 10.61 10.69 10.61 10.61 10.62
18 11.50 11.61 11.50 11.50 11.52
19 12.11 12.21 12.11 12.11 12.14
20 12.51 12.60 12.51 12.51 12.58
21 12.83 12.91 12.83 12.83 12.92
22 13.10 13.18 13.10 13.10 13.21
23 13.30 13.38 13.30 13.30 13.43
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Table A.11: Removal of Tuitions - Enrollment Rates by Age (%)
Age
Baseline
Model
(i)
All
Secondary
(ii)
African
& Colored
Secondary
(iii)
African
Secondary
(iv)
College
(v)
African
12 98.80 99.88 99.31 98.88 98.85
13 97.93 99.76 98.82 98.17 98.02
14 95.78 99.42 97.67 96.34 95.92
15 93.20 99.13 96.42 94.24 93.27
16 90.05 99.10 95.08 91.72 90.14
17 84.56 97.18 91.50 86.69 84.92
18 72.40 90.53 80.92 74.83 73.33
19 57.87 80.98 67.10 60.36 59.34
20 42.68 69.92 51.57 44.79 44.89
21 30.86 58.62 38.48 32.56 33.03
22 18.68 43.82 24.51 19.69 20.41
Colored
12 98.98 99.78 99.18 98.98 99.00
13 97.16 99.56 97.94 97.16 97.19
14 91.84 98.93 94.51 91.84 91.94
15 85.04 98.44 90.55 85.04 85.21
16 78.81 97.85 85.85 78.81 79.09
17 65.20 90.76 72.91 65.20 65.85
18 39.58 67.48 44.99 39.58 40.52
19 19.23 43.14 21.88 19.23 20.16
20 9.95 27.13 11.18 9.95 10.71
21 6.56 17.83 7.19 6.56 7.16
22 4.98 11.86 5.36 4.98 5.45
White
12 99.71 99.77 99.71 99.71 99.75
13 99.23 99.50 99.23 99.23 99.34
14 96.32 98.26 96.32 96.32 96.61
15 94.89 97.84 94.89 94.89 95.30
16 95.23 98.09 95.23 95.23 95.60
17 91.84 94.72 91.84 91.84 92.48
18 67.82 68.25 67.82 67.82 70.25
19 48.98 48.02 48.98 48.98 52.10
20 38.51 37.82 38.51 38.51 41.71
21 33.90 33.63 33.90 33.90 36.92
22 25.34 25.13 25.34 25.34 27.32
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Table A.12: Removal of Tuitions - Secondary School Depatment Choices (%)
Sec.
School
Dept.
Baseline
Model
(i)
All
Secondary
(ii)
African
& Colored
Secondary
(iii)
African
Secondary
(iv)
College
(v)
African
DET 85.40 0 1.25 85.88 84.55
HOR 12.77 0 97.99 12.37 13.62
HOA 1.83 100 0.76 1.75 1.83
Colored
DET 0.85 0 0 0.88 0.84
HOR 81.05 0 85.98 81.03 81.13
HOA 18.10 100 14.02 18.09 18.03
White
DET 0 0 0 0 0
HOR 0.02 0 0.02 0.02 0.01
HOA 99.98 100 99.98 99.98 99.99
Table A.13: Removal of Tuitions - School Attainment at age 23 (%)
School
Attainment
Baseline
Model
(i)
All
Secondary
(ii)
African
& Colored
Secondary
(iii)
African
Secondary
(iv)
College
(v)
African
<12 64.07 30.63 49.95 61.95 63.01
=12 21.95 38.92 26.29 23.41 20.43
>12 13.98 30.45 23.76 14.64 16.56
Colored
<12 66.62 33.38 60.13 66.63 65.84
=12 20.38 42.48 24.43 20.37 19.74
>12 13.0 24.14 15.44 13.0 14.42
White
<12 3.55 1.88 3.55 3.55 2.91
=12 26.19 25.72 26.19 26.19 23.55
>12 70.26 72.40 70.26 70.26 73.54
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